

Investor Heterogeneity and Liquidity

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Abstract

Fund flows are more correlated among funds with similar investment horizon, consistent with correlated demand for liquidity. We find that stocks held by institutions with more heterogeneous investment horizon are more liquid and have lower volatility of liquidity. Identification tests confirm that the improvement in stock liquidity holds when the increase in investor heterogeneity arises from an exogenous shock due to the 2003 tax reform. In addition, extreme flow-induced trading by institutional funds has a bigger price impact when stocks have a less heterogeneous investor base. Moreover, the premium associated with stock illiquidity is concentrated in stocks with low investor heterogeneity.

I. Introduction

Institutional investors have been exerting dominating influence in financial markets, and this represented a larger fraction of equity ownership and even a larger proportion of trading volume. For instance, in the U.S. equity market, institutional investors have accounted for about 34% of equity ownership in 1980 and reached 67% in 2010 (Blume and Keim (2017)). Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011) provide evidence that the monthly turnover on NYSE increased from about 5% to about 26% between 1993 and 2008. However, institutional investors are far from homogenous in terms of their trading preferences (e.g., Falkenstein (1996), Bennet, Sias, and Starks (2003), Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess (2016), and Blume and Keim (2017)).

Institutional investors can be quite different in terms of their investment objectives, mandates, and clienteles. One key source of heterogeneity among institutional investors is their investment horizon. Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2013) find that the university and foundation endowments, pension funds, and

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insurance companies tend to be long-horizon investors, whereas hedge funds, bank trusts, and investment companies tend to be short-horizon investors. As for the mutual fund companies, which comprise a great variety of strategies, their investment horizon is around the middle of the spectrum.

In this article, we examine how the heterogeneity of the investment horizon, as reflected in the dispersion of investment horizon among institutional investors in the stock, is related to the stock liquidity. We postulate that the dispersion of investment horizon, as a reflection of the heterogeneous investor base, can explain both the stock liquidity and volatility of liquidity. The underlying reason is that if a stock has a homogeneous investor base, then investors are likely to follow the same investment strategy and react to the same signals. Consequently, the order flows for the stock would be correlated and this would give rise to correlated liquidity demand shocks and, hence, a coordinated demand for liquidity. Investor heterogeneity, on the other hand, reflects the differences in investment strategy where investor-specific liquidity shocks are likely to be absorbed by other investor types. In support of this line of reasoning, we find that the comovement in fund flows among investment funds that share common investment horizon is indeed higher than the comovement in flows among funds that differ in their investment horizon. Thus, when institutional owners of stock have similar investment horizon and strategy, they face correlated demand for liquidity and when a stock is held mostly by such institutions, the stock is likely to be more illiquid.

Previous literature has shown that short-term and long-term institutions trade on diverse signals and opportunities. Short-term institutions trade on temporary signals, such as information (Yan and Zhang (2009)) and liquidity provision opportunities (Da, Gao, and Jagannathan (2011), Cheng, Hameed, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (2017)), and they are influenced by behavioral biases (Cremers and Pareek (2015)). These short-term institutional investors display correlated selling during periods of market turmoil to prevent outflows arising from short-term losses (e.g., Bernardo and Welch (2004), Morris and Shin (2004), and Cella et al. (2013)). If trading activities in a stock are dominated by short-term institutional investors, their correlated trading could lead to a bigger price impact and higher fluctuations in liquidity. On the other hand, long-term institutions trade primarily due to stochastic portfolio needs (e.g., index rebalancing) and long-term value investing (Greenwald, Kahn, Sonkin, and van Biema (2001), Cremers and Pareek (2016)). Their clients typically have longer investment horizons (such as participants in defined contribution retirement plans) and tend to be less sensitive to fund performance (Sialm, Starks, and Zhang (2015)), so that long-term institutions are exposed to less flow volatility, flow-performance sensitivity, and flow-induced price pressure. As a result, if a stock has a heterogeneous investor base, the diverse investment strategies make it easier for different groups of investors to accommodate investor-specific liquidity shocks. For instance, active, short-horizon mutual funds can provide liquidity to long-horizon index funds following index rebalancing, and long-horizon funds can provide liquidity to active mutual funds during fire sales. Furthermore, a wider difference in the types of institutional investors holding a stock can also increase the supply of loanable shares to short sellers and, hence, lower the

volatility of liquidity and increase stock liquidity.¹ Overall, we predict that the illiquidity and volatility of liquidity are lower for stocks with a more balanced composition of short-term and long-term institutional investors.

Our empirical analyses begin with measuring heterogeneity in institutional investors holding a stock in terms of their investment horizons. We first compute the churn rate of each institution in each quarter, following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). The larger the churn rate, the higher the institutional investors' portfolio turnover, and the shorter the investors' investment period. Next, the stock-level heterogeneity in investment horizon (STDCR) is computed in each quarter as the standard deviation of the churn rate of all institutions holding a stock, scaled by the average churn rate of the same set of institutions. To relate STDCR to stock illiquidity, we examine two dimensions of illiquidity: i) price impact measure of illiquidity in Amihud (2002) (LOGILLIQ) and ii) trading activity measure based on the inverse of stock turnover used in Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001).²

We find that investor heterogeneity is negatively related to both stock illiquidity and volatility of liquidity, as conjectured. For instance, a 1-standard-deviation increase in STDCR is related to 0.70% lower stock illiquidity measured by LOGILLIQ for the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq sample during the period of 1982 to 2016. In addition, a 1-standard-deviation increase in STDCR is associated with a 3.27% decrease in the volatility of LOGILLIQ. We obtain similar findings when we use the trading activity measure of liquidity. The economic magnitude of our findings increases by 2–3 times in the recent period from 2000 to 2016. This is consistent with the high growth in the diversity of institutional investor base driving the cross-sectional variation in stock liquidity and volatility of liquidity. Our basic findings are highly robust and remain intact after controlling for many stock characteristics, including the level and concentration in institutional ownership.

An important issue with our analyses is that investor heterogeneity and stock liquidity, as well as liquidity volatility, may be spuriously correlated due to reverse causality or presence of an endogenous relation. For example, as liquid stocks can be bought or sold without large price impact, both funds with a long or short investment horizon would include a liquid stock in their portfolios. On the other hand, an illiquid stock is subject to a larger transaction cost due to price impact, so that only funds with a long investment horizon would include the illiquid stock. Although it is difficult to categorically reject this alternative, we employ two different approaches to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity. First, we consider an identification strategy based on a tax reform that is exogenous to firm liquidity but affects investor heterogeneity. The U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (hereafter, the “2003 Tax Cut”) substantially reduced dividend

¹Nagel (2005) and Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), for example, show that stocks with higher institutional ownership have lower short-sale constraints. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that lower short-sale constraints improve stock liquidity, and the empirical support is provided in Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), among others. Different from these articles, we focus on the heterogeneity in the investment horizon of institutional investors and its impact of liquidity and the volatility of liquidity. We also show that our findings hold after controlling for the number of institutional owners, percentage of institutional ownership, and the concentration of institutional ownership in a stock.

²The Appendix provides detailed description of all variables.

taxes. Sialm and Starks (2012) show that the change in tax code caused mutual funds held by taxable investors to increase their relative likelihood of holding high dividend yield stocks. This is in contrast to these stocks being primarily held by mutual funds favored by long-term tax-qualified retirement accounts before 2003. Consistent with our expectation, the 2003 Tax Cut significantly increased the heterogeneity of investors for consistent dividend payers, relative to a matched control group of firms that initiated dividends following the tax cut. More importantly, when investor heterogeneity increases due to the tax cut, we find a concurrent decline in stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility. Our findings are amplified among stocks that experience a larger increase in investor heterogeneity. For example, stock illiquidity decreases between 9% and 26%, among stocks that register an above-average increase in investor heterogeneity following the tax cut.

Next, we use extreme institutional capital flows as exogenous liquidity shocks to establish the effect of investor heterogeneity on liquidity. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that when many funds are forced to liquidate their stock holdings within a short period due to heavy outflows, the stocks experience fire sales and their prices temporarily deviate from fundamental values. They find that extreme mutual fund outflows (inflows) exert significant price pressure that causes declines (increases) in the stock prices followed by price reversals over the subsequent quarters. Implicit in their fire sale story is that several different owners experience financial distress at the same time and sell the stocks simultaneously. We postulate that the flow-induced price pressure would be stronger in stocks with less heterogeneous investor base as these investors are more likely to face correlated flow shocks arising from a similarity in investment horizon (or similarity due to a common investment style or clientele). Indeed, we find that the price pressure and subsequent stock return reversals induced by extreme capital flows are statistically and economically larger for stocks with more homogeneous investor base. Taking all these findings together, our results are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality from stock liquidity to investor heterogeneity.

In addition, we find that the premium for illiquidity demanded by investors is concentrated among stocks with low investor heterogeneity. Specifically, we compute the illiquidity premium as the difference in the risk-adjusted returns on illiquid and liquid stocks (i.e., returns on illiquid stocks minus the returns on liquid stocks). The illiquidity premium among stocks with low investor heterogeneity is a highly significant 12.32% per year, whereas the corresponding illiquidity premium among stocks with high investor heterogeneity is an insignificant 2.21% per annum. Hence, the level of stock illiquidity is a bigger concern among stocks with homogeneous investors, and the stock price reflects a premium for the exposure to liquidity shocks arising from correlated liquidity needs of its investor base. Overall, our evidence supports the notion that the homogeneity of the investor base affects stock liquidity and stock price.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In **Section II**, we describe the data and the construction of the main variables, and present some stylized characteristics associated with investor heterogeneity. In **Section III**, we examine the relationship between investor heterogeneity and stock liquidity and liquidity volatility. In **Section IV**, we relate investor heterogeneity to the illiquidity premium. A brief conclusion follows in **Section V**.

II. Data and Variable Construction

A. Data Sources

Our sample consists of all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq common stocks with share code 10 or 11, with daily and monthly stock data obtained from the CRSP. We acquire quarterly institutional equity holdings from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database and the Mutual Fund Holdings database.³ We obtain other fund characteristics from the CRSP mutual fund database, such as monthly net-of-fee returns and total net assets (TNA). Quarterly and annual financial statement data come from the Compustat database. The full sample period ranges between 1982 and 2016. Our sample begins in 1982 as the 13F holdings information is only available from the 1980s and we require 4 quarters to construct the proxy for investor heterogeneity. To minimize microstructure biases emanating from low-priced stocks, we exclude “penny” stocks whose prices are below \$5 at the end of the previous quarter.⁴

B. Main Variables

Our main measure of investor heterogeneity relies on the investment horizon of institutional investors. We first compute the churn rate of fund f in quarter q :

$$CR_{f,q} = \sum_{r=1}^4 \widetilde{CR}_{f,q-r+1} / 4,$$

and

$$\widetilde{CR}_{f,q} = \sum_{i \in S} |N_{i,f,q} P_{i,q} - N_{i,f,q-1} P_{i,q-1} - N_{i,f,q-1} \Delta P_{i,q}| / \sum_{i \in S} [(N_{i,f,q} P_{i,q} + N_{i,f,q-1} P_{i,q-1}) / 2],$$

where S refers to the set of companies held by fund f , and $P_{i,q}$ and $N_{i,f,q}$ refer to the price and the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , respectively, following Gaspar et al. (2005). The churn rate of fund f reflects the fund’s average turnover of stocks held in the portfolio, that is, the investment horizon of the fund. By construction, the value of the churn rate ranges between 0 and 2. The larger the churn rate, the higher the institutional investor’s portfolio turnover, which implies a shorter investment horizon.⁵ Hence, the heterogeneity of a stock’s investor base is low when most investors owning the stock have similar investment holding period.

We proceed to construct the measure of the heterogeneity of investors as follows: For stock i in quarter q , the variation in its investor base (STDCR $_{i,q}$) is defined as $\frac{USTDCR_{i,q}}{CR_{i,q}}$, where $USTDCR_{i,q}$ refers to the standard deviation of the churn rate of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q , and $CR_{i,q}$ refers to the average churn rate of all funds holding stock i at the same quarter. A low STDCR indicates that all

³The institutional ownership data come from quarterly 13F filings of money managers to the SEC. The database contains the positions of all the institutional investment managers with more than \$100 million U.S. dollars under discretionary management. All holdings worth more than \$200,000 U.S. dollars or 10,000 shares are reported in the database.

⁴Our findings are robust to alternative data selection criterion such as excluding stocks below \$1.

⁵Unreported results suggest that the average churn rate is 0.2, indicating that on average it takes 10 quarters to churn the entire portfolio once.

investors in the firm have similar investment horizon, either short-term or long-term investment horizon. When a stock is held by investors with heterogeneous investment horizon, the large dispersion in holding periods across institutional shareholders implies a high STDCR. Unreported analyses confirm the strong correlation between STDCR and the unscaled measure, USTDCR, and the correlation is 0.8. In addition, scaling USTDCR by the average churn rate (CR) helps to isolate the effect of investor heterogeneity from that of average churn rate, as STDCR displays a low correlation of 0.37 with CR, and the correlation between USTDCR and CR is higher at 0.57. We also show that the main findings on the relationship between investor heterogeneity and stock liquidity hold when we use STDCR or USTDCR to measure dispersion in investor horizon. Moreover, we report similar findings with alternative measures of investor heterogeneity in the section on robustness tests.⁶

We relate investor heterogeneity to two aspects of stock liquidity: liquidity level and volatility of liquidity. We consider two dimensions of stock illiquidity: i) (the logarithm of) Amihud (2002) measure of price impact, labeled LOGILLIQ; and ii) the inverse of stock turnover which measures the level of trading activity, labeled 1/TURN. We define liquidity volatility as the logarithm of the coefficient of variation of Amihud illiquidity or turnover, and label them LOGCVILLIQ and LOGCVTURN, respectively. In comparing various measures of price impact, Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show that the LOGILLIQ outperforms other liquidity measures.⁷

Our analyses also incorporate several stock-level control variables. These include log(SIZE), defined as the logarithm of the market capitalization of a stock; log(BM), the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio of a stock; log(RET_VOL), the logarithm of the return volatility of a stock; RETQ1, the stock returns over the previous quarter; RETQ2–4, the stock returns over the three quarters ending at the beginning of the previous quarter; NUM_FUND, the number of funds holding the stock in the quarter; and IO, the percentage of institutional ownership of a stock. A detailed description of all variables is provided in the [Appendix](#).

C. Stylized Characteristics Associated with Investor Heterogeneity

1. Summary Statistics

[Table 1](#) provides the summary statistics of stocks sorted into quintiles based on investor heterogeneity (STDCR). Panel A first confirms that the variation in investor heterogeneity (STDCR) in the cross section of stocks coincides with the unscaled dispersion of investment horizons among the institutional investors (USTDCR), and is not driven by a denominator effect of average investment horizon (CR). It is apparent that investor heterogeneity is negatively related to

⁶The investment horizon can also be proxied by fund self-reported turnover, but the CRSP only provides such information for mutual funds. We rely on the 13F holdings information and churn rate to maximize the coverage of institutional trading activity. As a robustness check, we measure the investment horizon of institutional investors using the turnover derived from their portfolio holdings and obtain similar results.

⁷Chordia et al. (2001) document that the volatility of trading activity, LOGCVTURN, is negatively related to the cross section of expected returns—a finding that is inconsistent with risk averse investors requiring higher returns on stocks with greater variability in liquidity.

TABLE 1
Investor Heterogeneity and Stock Characteristics

In Table 1, stocks are sorted into quintiles according to lagged investor heterogeneity in quarter q . Panel A reports, for each quintile portfolio, the average investor heterogeneity (STDCR), standard deviation of the churn rate (USTDCR), average churn rate (CR) in quarter q , the average LOGILLIQ, 1/TURN, LOGCVILLIQ, and LOGCVTURN in the following quarter $q+1$. Panel B reports log(SIZE), log(BM), log(RET_VOL), RETURN, RETQ1, RETQ2-4, NUM_FUND, and IO represented by each quintile portfolio in formation quarter q . The sample period ranges from 1982 to 2016. The row "HML" reports the difference in values between high and low investor heterogeneity portfolios ("Top 20% - Bottom 20%"). The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. Newey-West adjusted t -statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A. Stock Characteristics Sorted by Lagged Investor Heterogeneity

Rank of STDCR	STDCR	USTDCR	CR	RETURN _{$q+1$}	LOGILLIQ _{$q+1$}	1/TURN _{$q+1$}	LOGCVILLIQ _{$q+1$}	LOGCVTURN _{$q+1$}
Low	0.535	11.688	20.934	3.087	-1.488	20.099	0.404	0.215
2	0.681	15.379	22.208	3.243	-3.333	8.539	0.198	-0.046
3	0.748	16.552	21.868	3.486	-3.895	7.466	0.136	-0.125
4	0.828	18.050	21.447	3.531	-4.329	7.464	0.099	-0.180
High	1.103	27.497	21.710	3.520	-3.581	11.996	0.188	-0.091
HML	0.568*** (7.60)	15.809*** (4.16)	0.775 (1.25)	0.433* (1.77)	-2.093*** (-8.85)	-8.103*** (-3.88)	-0.216*** (-8.99)	-0.305*** (-9.89)

Panel B. Stock Characteristics Sorted by Contemporaneous Investor Heterogeneity

Rank of STDCR	log(SIZE)	log(BM)	log (RET_VOL)	RETURN	RETQ1	RETQ2-4	NUM_FUND	IO
Low	4.765	-0.306	0.949	3.188	7.025	23.244	0.039	0.320
2	5.741	-0.478	0.910	3.320	6.438	22.737	0.077	0.480
3	6.122	-0.492	0.847	3.602	5.380	17.536	0.103	0.506
4	6.464	-0.513	0.787	3.505	5.037	12.956	0.139	0.509
High	6.107	-0.487	0.820	3.448	5.339	11.981	0.156	0.419
HML	1.343*** (10.25)	-0.180*** (-4.69)	-0.128*** (-7.92)	0.260 (0.87)	-1.687*** (-4.51)	-11.262*** (-8.98)	0.117*** (9.15)	0.099*** (6.35)

the future level and volatility of illiquidity. As reported in Panel A, stocks in the lowest quintile in terms of investor heterogeneity have significantly higher illiquidity and volatility of liquidity relative to stocks in the highest quintile. To provide an idea of the economic magnitude of these differences, we scale the difference in values between the 2 extreme quintiles by the standard deviation of these measures.⁸ The illiquidity of stocks in the low investor heterogeneity quintile is larger than that in the high quintile by 63% (37%) when measured by LOGILLIQ (1/TURN). Similarly, the volatility of liquidity (LOGCVILLIQ) and trading activity (LOGCVTURN) in low investor heterogeneity quintile are higher by 49% and 52%, respectively. As reported in Panel B, stocks in the highest quintile of investor heterogeneity appear to be larger, growth firms, have lower return volatility and poorer past performance, and exhibit more institutional participation in terms of the number of funds and percentage owned by institutions.

The initial impression from Table 1 is that stocks with more heterogeneous investor base are associated with higher liquidity and lower volatility of liquidity. In Section III, we formally establish the relationship between investor heterogeneity and stock liquidity.

2. Comovement in Fund Flows

Prior literature shows that short-term and long-term institutions trade on diverse signals and opportunities. Short-term institutions trade on temporary signals, such as information and liquidity provision opportunities, and they are

⁸The standard deviations of LOGILLIQ, 1/TURN, LOGCVILLIQ, and LOGCVTURN in the full sample are 3.320, 21.624, 0.442, and 0.585, respectively.

influenced by behavioral biases (e.g., Yan and Zhang (2009), Da et al. (2011), Cremers and Pareek (2015), and Cheng et al. (2017)), whereas long-term institutions trade primarily due to stochastic portfolio needs such as index rebalancing and long-term value investing (Greenwald et al. (2001), Cremers and Pareek (2016)). This suggests that investors in funds with similar investment horizon are more likely to respond similarly and display more correlated flows. To be more specific, the investment strategy adopted by a professional asset manager reflects the investment horizon and risk preference of their investors. Therefore, institutions with similar investment horizon could be exposed to more correlated inflows and outflows due to the similar investment objectives and investor clientele. Both supply-side (e.g., correlated flow) and demand-side (e.g., correlated investment strategy) effects arising from common investment horizon could have important implications on institutional trading and stock liquidity. Given that most existing evidence points to the demand-side explanation, we provide additional evidence to link the investment horizon with comovement in fund flows. To do this, we focus on the subset of open-end equity mutual funds (rather than aggregate 13F institutions) for which we are able to obtain holdings and flows at the individual fund level.

For each mutual fund f , we compute the fund flow in a month m as follows:

$$(1) \quad \text{FLOW}_{f,m} = [\text{TNA}_{f,m} - \text{TNA}_{f,m-1} \times (1 + r_{f,m})] / \text{TNA}_{f,m-1},$$

where $\text{TNA}_{f,m}$ refers to the total net assets (TNA) of fund f in month m , and $r_{f,m}$ refers to the fund total return in the same month. In each quarter q , mutual funds are then sorted into terciles according to the average churn rate (CR) in the previous 3 years. For each fund quarter, fund flow comovement is estimated from the following bivariate regressions over the previous 3 years:

$$(2) \quad \text{FLOW}_{f,m} = \alpha_{f,m} + \sum_{i=-k}^k \beta_{\text{IN},f,m+i} \text{FLOW}_{\text{IN},f,m+i} \\ + \sum_{i=-k}^k \beta_{\text{OUT},f,m+i} \text{FLOW}_{\text{OUT},f,m+i} + \varepsilon_{f,m},$$

where $\text{FLOW}_{f,m}$ refers to the flow of fund f in month m , $\text{FLOW}_{\text{IN},f,m+i}$ refers to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) flow across funds in the same tercile of churn rate as fund f , and $\text{FLOW}_{\text{OUT},f,m+i}$ refers to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) flow across funds that are not in the same tercile of churn rate as fund f . We also allow for the potential lead-lag effect on fund flows by including the contemporaneous fund flows, as well as the fund flows in 1 month ($k=1$) or 2 months ($k=2$) before and after the current month in equation (2). The comovement in fund flows among funds with similar investment horizons (i.e., within the same CR tercile) is the sum of regression coefficients, that is, $\sum_i \beta_{\text{IN},f,m+i}$. Similarly, $\sum_i \beta_{\text{OUT},f,m+i}$ proxies for the comovement in fund flows among funds with different investment horizons (i.e., in the other 2 CR terciles).

We report the results in Table 2. We find that across all CR terciles, flows to a mutual fund comove more with flows to other funds with similar investment horizon and comove less with flows into funds with different investment horizons. For instance, in Panel A, where portfolio flows are equal-weighted and $k=1$, the

TABLE 2
Investor Heterogeneity and Comovement in Mutual Fund Flows

In Table 2, mutual funds are sorted into terciles according to lagged churn rate (average in the previous 3 years) in quarter q . For each fund f in each quarter, fund flow comovement is estimated from the following bivariate regressions over the previous 3 years, $FLOW_{f,m} = \alpha_{f,m} + \sum_{i=-k}^k \beta_{IN,f,m+i} FLOW_{IN,f,m+i} + \sum_{i=-k}^k \beta_{OUT,f,m+i} FLOW_{OUT,f,m+i} + \varepsilon_{f,m}$, where $FLOW_{f,m}$ refers to the flow of fund f of month m , and $FLOW_{IN,f,m+i}$ and $FLOW_{OUT,f,m+i}$ refer to the equal- or value-weighted flow across funds in (not in) the same tercile of churn rate as fund f . We also allow for the potential lead-lag effect in fund flows by including the contemporaneous fund flows, as well as the fund flows in 1 month ($k=1$) or 2 months ($k=2$) before and after the current month. This table presents the average parameters ($\sum_i \beta_{IN,f,m+i}$ and $\sum_i \beta_{OUT,f,m+i}$) and their difference in each tercile portfolio ("WMO"), as well as the differences in values between high and low churn rate portfolios ("HML"). Panel A employs equal-weighted portfolio flows ($FLOW_{IN,f,m+i}$ and $FLOW_{OUT,f,m+i}$), whereas Panel B employs lagged-TNA weighted portfolio flows. The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. Newey–West adjusted t -statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Rank of CR	[-1, +1]			[-2, +2]		
	Within	Outside	WMO	Within	Outside	WMO
<i>Panel A. Fund Flow Comovement Sorted by Lagged Churn Rate (Equal-Weighted)</i>						
Low	0.801*** (17.64)	0.124*** (4.44)	0.677*** (9.58)	0.787*** (14.14)	0.139*** (3.94)	0.648*** (7.39)
Med	0.740*** (9.51)	0.328*** (5.49)	0.412*** (3.07)	0.725*** (7.77)	0.338*** (4.70)	0.387** (2.42)
High	0.977*** (19.09)	0.157* (1.92)	0.819*** (6.36)	1.024*** (16.19)	0.085 (0.82)	0.940*** (5.87)
HML	0.176** (2.04)	0.034 (0.36)		0.237** (2.22)	-0.054 (-0.46)	
<i>Panel B. Fund Flow Comovement Sorted by Lagged Churn Rate (Value-Weighted)</i>						
Low	0.676*** (14.68)	0.409*** (12.22)	0.267*** (3.95)	0.654*** (11.40)	0.428*** (10.01)	0.225*** (2.63)
Med	0.750*** (9.54)	0.464*** (6.00)	0.286* (1.89)	0.840*** (8.22)	0.369*** (3.46)	0.471** (2.32)
High	0.927*** (14.33)	0.652*** (6.17)	0.275* (1.72)	1.094*** (13.32)	0.620*** (4.80)	0.473** (2.45)
HML	0.251** (2.48)	0.243** (2.26)		0.440*** (3.62)	0.192 (1.45)	

fund flows of a low CR fund (i.e., long-term investment fund) are highly correlated with flows to other funds within the same low CR group ($\sum_i \beta_{IN,f,m+i} = 0.80$) and comove less with flows to funds that are not in the low CR group ($\sum_i \beta_{OUT,f,m+i} = 0.12$). The difference in these 2 comovement estimates is 0.68 and highly significant (t -stat = 9.58). Similarly, for funds in the high CR tercile, their flows are significantly more correlated with other high CR funds ($\sum_i \beta_{IN,f,m+i} = 0.98$) than with flows to low CR funds ($\sum_i \beta_{OUT,f,m+i} = 0.16$). Our findings are qualitatively similar when we estimate the comovement using a 2-month lead-lag effect of flows (Panel A) or fund flows are weighted by each fund's lagged TNA (Panel B). The latter finding suggests that differences in fund size are not likely to explain our results. Interestingly, the estimates also indicate that fund flows comove more among high CR (i.e., short-term) funds than low CR funds.

Our findings imply that a stock that is owned by investors with homogeneous investment horizon is more likely to face similar (correlated) flow-induced price pressure, intensifying the effect of aggregate fund flows on stock price and worsening the stock's liquidity. On the other hand, a stock with a diverse investor base is less prone to flow effects as the institutions holding the stock face less correlated flows, hence improving the stock's liquidity. Similarly, higher correlated flows may have a similar amplification effect on the stock's volatility of

liquidity. The findings in Table 2 provide further motivation for our investigation of the relation between the heterogeneity in investors' investment horizon and stock liquidity.

III. Investor Heterogeneity and Stock Liquidity

In this section, we conduct an encompassing set of tests to examine whether the heterogeneity in the investment horizon of investors owning the stock explains the cross-sectional variation in the level and volatility of stock liquidity. We start by showing that stocks with more heterogeneous investors are not only more liquid, but also exhibit lower future variability of liquidity and trading activity, after controlling for various stock characteristics that may affect liquidity, including the level and concentration of institutional ownership. Our main results are particularly stronger in recent years with a sharp increase in aggregate institutional participation. A natural concern is that the investor heterogeneity and stock liquidity, as well as liquidity volatility, may be spuriously correlated due to unobserved firm characteristics or reverse causality. We alleviate this concern by examining the effects of an exogenous change in stock's investor heterogeneity based on the implementation of dividend tax reform in 2003. In addition, we use the price pressure and subsequent return reversal arising from extreme institutional capital flows as a setting to examine the differences in liquidity effects attributable to the relation between investor heterogeneity and liquidity. We also have a couple of robustness tests at the end of this section.

A. Investor Heterogeneity and Stock Liquidity

To document the relationship between investor heterogeneity and stock liquidity, we estimate the following quarterly Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression:

$$(3) \quad \text{ILLIQ}_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{STDCR}_{i,q-1} + c\mathbf{M}_{i,q-1} + e_{i,q},$$

where $\text{ILLIQ}_{i,q}$ refers to the stock illiquidity proxies $\text{LOGILLIQ}_{i,q}$ or $1/\text{TURN}_{i,q}$ of stock i in quarter q , and $\text{STDCR}_{i,q-1}$ refers to stock i 's investor heterogeneity in investment horizon. The vector \mathbf{M} stacks all stock-specific control variables, including the $\log(\text{SIZE})$, $\log(\text{BM})$, $\log(\text{RET_VOL})$, RETQ1 , RETQ2-4 , NUM_FUND , and IO . Since the stock illiquidity is highly persistent, we also control for lagged stock illiquidity (as indicated by the $\text{AR}(1)$ variable) and report Newey and West (1987) adjusted t -statistics.

Models 1–4 in Panel A of Table 3 show that consistent with prior literature, stock illiquidity measured by price impact or trading activity is higher for small, value stocks and those with a lower percentage of institutional ownership. Both proxies of illiquidity, LOGILLIQ and $1/\text{TURN}$, exhibit a similar relationship with these firm characteristics, except that past losers exhibit greater price impact based on LOGILLIQ but have higher trading volume (therefore lower $1/\text{TURN}$). More importantly, investor heterogeneity is positively related to future stock liquidity, and this relation is significant across all illiquidity measures and regression specifications. For instance, in model 2 (model 4) in Panel A, a 1-standard-deviation

TABLE 3
Investor Heterogeneity, Stock Liquidity, and Liquidity Volatility

Table 3 presents the results of the following quarterly Fama–MacBeth regressions, as well as their corresponding Newey–West adjusted *t*-statistics, $ILLIQ_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 STDCR_{i,q-1} + \mathbf{cM}_{i,q-1} + e_{i,q}$, $CVILLIQ_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 STDCR_{i,q-1} + \mathbf{cM}_{i,q-1} + e_{i,q}$, where $ILLIQ_{i,q}$ refers to the 2 stock illiquidity proxies $LOGILLIQ_{i,q}$ and $1/TURN_{i,q}$ of stock *i* in quarter *q*, $CVILLIQ_{i,q}$ refers to the 2 stock liquidity volatility proxies $LOGCVILLIQ_{i,q}$ and $LOGCVTURN_{i,q}$. $STDCR_{i,q-1}$ refers to the investor heterogeneity in investment horizon, and the vector \mathbf{M} stacks all other control variables, including the $\log(\text{SIZE})$, $\log(\text{BM})$, $\log(\text{RET_VOL})$, RETQ1 , RETQ2-4 , NUM_FUND , and IO . $\text{AR}(1)$ refers to the lagged dependent variable. Panel A reports the regression results over the entire sample period from 1982 to 2016, whereas Panel B reports similar statistics in the subperiod from 2000 to 2016. Panel C further replaces $STDCR_{i,q-1}$ with $USTDCR_{i,q-1}$ (defined as the standard deviation of the churn rate of all funds holding the stock) and $\text{CR}_{i,q-1}$ (defined as the average churn rate of all funds holding the stock) in the subperiod from 2000 to 2016. The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LOGILLIQ		1/TURN		LOGCVILLIQ		LOGCVTURN	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>Panel A. Stock Liquidity and Liquidity Volatility Regressed on Lagged Investor Heterogeneity (1982–2016)</i>								
STDCR	-0.056** (-2.51)	-0.064*** (-2.84)	-1.307** (-2.48)	-1.556*** (-3.12)	-0.034*** (-2.65)	-0.040*** (-3.26)	-0.082*** (-4.28)	-0.087*** (-4.91)
log(SIZE)	-0.215*** (-21.64)	-0.213*** (-23.55)	-0.688*** (-9.94)	-0.201*** (-5.30)	-0.067*** (-15.59)	-0.056*** (-25.90)	-0.121*** (-18.58)	-0.107*** (-46.50)
log(BM)	0.023*** (5.23)	0.024*** (5.25)	0.478*** (6.75)	0.548*** (7.43)	-0.004** (-2.10)	-0.004** (-2.21)	0.013*** (3.83)	0.012*** (3.65)
log(RET_VOL)	-0.087*** (-7.14)	-0.062*** (-5.62)	0.483*** (3.00)	0.714*** (4.41)	-0.020** (-2.39)	-0.014** (-1.98)	-0.097*** (-12.93)	-0.086*** (-11.87)
RETQ1	-0.497*** (-20.38)	-0.508*** (-20.62)	2.402*** (6.42)	1.983*** (5.47)	-0.029*** (-4.12)	-0.038*** (-5.42)	0.029*** (2.62)	0.016 (1.59)
RETQ2-4	-0.021** (-2.57)	-0.041*** (-4.96)	0.194 (1.31)	-0.004 (-0.03)	-0.005 (-1.25)	-0.013*** (-2.77)	0.008 (1.45)	-0.000 (-0.02)
NUM_FUND	0.096* (1.67)		0.570 (1.24)		-0.056 (-1.04)		-0.078 (-1.09)	
IO		-0.356*** (-14.34)		-6.182*** (-10.24)		-0.104*** (-6.14)		-0.161*** (-7.15)
AR(1)	0.869*** (143.56)	0.842*** (126.17)	0.794*** (62.85)	0.770*** (60.32)	0.527*** (34.37)	0.524*** (33.73)	0.399*** (47.09)	0.390*** (42.99)
Intercept	0.927*** (15.41)	0.990*** (16.61)	7.331*** (8.43)	7.402*** (9.13)	0.542*** (18.65)	0.523*** (25.88)	0.822*** (22.04)	0.805*** (30.67)
Adj. R ²	0.969	0.969	0.689	0.693	0.593	0.594	0.575	0.577
No. of quarters	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
No. of obs.	228,196	228,196	228,255	228,255	228,181	228,181	228,255	228,255
<i>Panel B. Stock Liquidity and Liquidity Volatility Regressed on Lagged Investor Heterogeneity (2000–2016)</i>								
STDCR	-0.130*** (-3.80)	-0.138*** (-3.80)	-1.771*** (-4.04)	-1.894*** (-4.50)	-0.062*** (-2.69)	-0.056** (-2.51)	-0.134*** (-4.29)	-0.127*** (-4.19)
log(SIZE)	-0.247*** (-18.55)	-0.236*** (-18.36)	-0.641*** (-6.90)	-0.141*** (-4.25)	-0.087*** (-19.96)	-0.049*** (-14.51)	-0.154*** (-43.24)	-0.108*** (-33.54)
log(BM)	0.036*** (6.52)	0.037*** (7.56)	0.282*** (6.62)	0.343*** (6.53)	0.002 (0.85)	0.002 (1.01)	0.002 (0.51)	0.001 (0.16)
log(RET_VOL)	-0.134*** (-9.53)	-0.096*** (-7.55)	0.096 (0.67)	0.426** (2.62)	-0.050*** (-6.45)	-0.035*** (-4.81)	-0.110*** (-12.59)	-0.085*** (-10.01)
RETQ1	-0.493*** (-16.58)	-0.510*** (-16.36)	1.109*** (4.70)	0.673*** (3.68)	-0.021** (-2.40)	-0.044*** (-4.94)	0.045*** (2.81)	0.014 (0.90)
RETQ2-4	-0.021 (-1.66)	-0.053*** (-4.25)	-0.131 (-1.02)	-0.338*** (-2.93)	-0.002 (-0.24)	-0.017** (-2.07)	0.017** (2.50)	-0.002 (-0.23)
NUM_FUND	0.355*** (12.06)		2.264*** (6.63)		0.247*** (10.86)		0.291*** (16.70)	
IO		-0.462*** (-14.06)		-4.354*** (-8.54)		-0.187*** (-18.50)		-0.261*** (-18.56)
AR(1)	0.867*** (125.78)	0.827*** (90.70)	0.805*** (50.07)	0.772*** (48.47)	0.569*** (24.01)	0.556*** (22.59)	0.377*** (38.23)	0.355*** (40.08)
Intercept	1.140*** (12.79)	1.177*** (12.48)	6.780*** (7.08)	6.229*** (7.69)	0.641*** (13.72)	0.514*** (12.83)	0.959*** (18.77)	0.819*** (17.22)
Adj. R ²	0.974	0.975	0.739	0.744	0.677	0.679	0.597	0.603
No. of quarters	68	68	68	68	68	68	68	68
No. of obs.	100,613	100,613	100,613	100,613	100,611	100,611	100,613	100,613

(continued on next page)

TABLE 3 (continued)
Investor Heterogeneity, Stock Liquidity, and Liquidity Volatility

Panel C. Stock Liquidity and Liquidity Volatility Regressed on Lagged Investor Heterogeneity (2000–2016)

	LOGILLIQ		1/TURN		LOGCVILLIQ		LOGCVTURN	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
USTDCR	-0.004** (-2.56)	-0.005*** (-2.73)	-0.059*** (-2.82)	-0.067*** (-3.34)	-0.002* (-1.90)	-0.002* (-1.74)	-0.005*** (-3.42)	-0.005*** (-3.35)
CR	-0.012*** (-7.34)	-0.011*** (-7.97)	-0.108*** (-4.86)	-0.062*** (-3.60)	-0.005*** (-6.43)	-0.005*** (-6.22)	-0.003** (-2.45)	-0.002* (-1.83)
log(SIZE)	-0.258*** (-19.23)	-0.261*** (-17.75)	-0.480*** (-6.24)	-0.154*** (-4.85)	-0.080*** (-20.17)	-0.051*** (-15.77)	-0.145*** (-40.30)	-0.110*** (-35.98)
log(BM)	0.039*** (7.05)	0.041*** (8.29)	0.321*** (6.94)	0.369*** (6.44)	0.003 (1.24)	0.003 (1.47)	0.003 (0.72)	0.002 (0.40)
log(RET_VOL)	-0.102*** (-7.82)	-0.066*** (-5.56)	0.352** (2.43)	0.571*** (3.47)	-0.036*** (-4.97)	-0.024*** (-3.61)	-0.094*** (-10.35)	-0.075*** (-8.85)
RETQ1	-0.471*** (-15.27)	-0.479*** (-14.69)	1.187*** (5.18)	0.823*** (4.40)	-0.015 (-1.61)	-0.033*** (-3.66)	0.049*** (3.04)	0.022 (1.39)
RETQ2-4	0.010 (0.70)	-0.019 (-1.32)	0.186 (1.42)	-0.055 (-0.50)	0.013 (1.63)	0.000 (0.03)	0.031*** (4.31)	0.013* (1.80)
NUM_FUND	0.233*** (9.02)		0.893*** (3.81)		0.179*** (9.92)		0.216*** (13.23)	
IO		-0.430*** (-13.83)		-3.864*** (-8.71)		-0.154*** (-17.35)		-0.227*** (-18.46)
AR(1)	0.848*** (105.23)	0.808*** (77.74)	0.793*** (47.07)	0.766*** (46.54)	0.554*** (23.46)	0.543*** (22.27)	0.371*** (40.50)	0.352*** (41.10)
Intercept	1.364*** (15.14)	1.454*** (14.20)	7.950*** (6.92)	7.099*** (7.28)	0.704*** (18.36)	0.608*** (17.52)	0.964*** (25.43)	0.840*** (23.26)
Adj. R^2	0.975	0.975	0.742	0.746	0.680	0.683	0.600	0.605
No. of quarters	68	68	68	68	68	68	68	68
No. of obs.	100,613	100,613	100,613	100,613	100,611	100,611	100,613	100,613

increase in STDCR is related to 0.70% (2.60%) lower stock illiquidity when measured by LOGILLIQ (1/TURN).⁹

The U.S. equity market underwent substantial technological and structural changes in the past decade that has improved stock liquidity and facilitated intensive trading activity (see Chordia et al. (2011), Chordia et al. (2014)). At the same time, there has been a sharp growth in the diversity of institutional participation, including endowment funds, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, exchange-traded funds, and high-frequency traders. The average institutional ownership in our sample increases from 38% in the pre-2000 period to 55% in the post-2000 period.

To assess whether the investor heterogeneity has gained greater importance given the growing trend of overall market liquidity and institutional participation, we report the estimates of equation (3) based on the recent subperiod from 2000 to 2016. As reported in Panel B of Table 3, the inverse cross-sectional association between investor heterogeneity and stock illiquidity is indeed much stronger in the recent subperiod. In terms of economic magnitude, a 1-standard-deviation increase in STDCR reduces the stock illiquidity by 1.93% (7.41%) when measured by

⁹The impact of stock illiquidity measured by LOGILLIQ is -0.70%, computed as $-0.064 \times 0.361/3.320$, where -0.064 is the regression coefficient in model 2, 0.361 is the standard deviation of STDCR, and 3.320 is the standard deviation of LOGILLIQ.

LOGILLIQ (1/TURN) as shown in model 2 (model 4).¹⁰ The almost threefold increase in the economic magnitude of the estimates in recent years emphasizes the growing impact of cross-sectional variation in investor heterogeneity on stock liquidity. This is also not surprising as we should expect our measure of heterogeneity in the investor base to be more reliable as institutional ownership becomes a bigger fraction of total ownership of a stock.

We move on to examine the notion that a heterogeneous investor base may help absorb investor-specific liquidity shocks and, hence, reduce the liquidity volatility. To achieve this goal, we replace the stock illiquidity in equation (3) with stock liquidity volatility, that is, proxied by the volatility of Amihud price impact measure (LOGCVILLIQ) and volatility of trading activity (LOGCVTURN). The results are reported in models 5–8 of Table 3. The volatility of liquidity is higher for small stocks and the stocks with lower institutional ownership, similar to the findings on stock illiquidity. Stocks with higher return volatility tend to have lower volatility of liquidity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that investor heterogeneity is negatively associated with future volatility of stock liquidity. In Panel A, a 1-standard-deviation increase in STDCR is associated with a decrease in liquidity volatility of 3.27% (5.37%) measured by LOGCVILLIQ (LOGCVTURN) over the entire sample period in model 6 (model 8). The results are also stronger in the post-2000 subperiod. As presented in Panel B, a 1-standard-deviation increase in STDCR reduces liquidity volatility by an economically significant 6.18% (10.53%) measured by LOGCVILLIQ (LOGCVTURN) in model 6 (model 8). The doubling of the economic magnitude of the estimates in recent years suggests that the growing diversity of institutional investors has also strengthened the cross-sectional relation between investor heterogeneity and the volatility of liquidity.¹¹

Our main measure of investor heterogeneity (STDCR) is defined as the dispersion of investment horizons among the institutional investors (USTDCR) scaled by the average investment horizon (CR). Panel C of Table 3 separately investigates these 2 components to shed more light on the driving force of investor heterogeneity. Several findings are worth noting. First, the average investment horizon (CR) is negatively related to illiquidity and volatility of liquidity. This is not surprising as short-term institutions favor liquid stocks and stocks with less liquidity risk. Second, the heterogeneity in investment horizons (USTDCR) remains significant after controlling for the level of the investment horizon. Therefore, we confirm that investor heterogeneity is associated with higher future stock liquidity and lower volatility of liquidity, and our measure of investor heterogeneity (STDCR) reflects the dispersion of investment horizons and is not driven by a denominator effect of average investment horizon of institutions.¹²

¹⁰The corresponding standard deviations that apply to STDCR, LOGILLIQ, 1/TURN, LOGCVILLIQ, and LOGCVTURN in Panel B of Table 3 are 0.491, 3.503, 12.543, 0.445, and 0.592, respectively.

¹¹We have performed additional analyses which are not reported here, and find that the relationship between investor heterogeneity and the volatility of liquidity is stronger in the subperiod with high institutional ownership, where high ownership is defined as being above median ownership level over the entire sample period.

¹²We also find that high STDCR is negatively related to stock return volatility, an important determinant of stock illiquidity. The results are robust to controlling for illiquidity and other stock characteristics and are reported in Table IA1 in the Supplementary Material.

B. Identification Test Based on the 2003 Tax Cut

We next present results from an identification strategy using the passage of the 2003 Tax Cut as an exogenous shock to investor heterogeneity. Specifically, the 2003 Tax Cut reduced the top federal marginal tax rate on qualified dividends from 38.6% to 15%, equalizing the tax rate on dividends and long-term capital gains. The effect of the 2003 Tax Cut has been investigated in several studies. For example, Chetty and Saez (2005) report that the huge increase in the number of firms that initiate dividends immediately after the enactment of the law is not confounded by other factors that may influence the payout decision. The tax cut, which was effective from Jan. 2003, presents a natural experiment for our investigation of the effect of investor heterogeneity on stock liquidity.

Due to the large reduction in the dividend tax rate, the 2003 Tax Cut reduces the tax disadvantage of dividends for the taxable investor. Sialm and Starks (2012) document that prior to the 2003 Tax Cut, long-term mutual funds managing retirement accounts made significantly higher dividend distributions than funds with taxable clienteles, although such difference attenuated after the implementation of the 2003 Tax Cut. They show that mutual funds with taxable investors are more likely to hold high dividend yield stocks after the 2003 tax reform. On the other hand, they find that the effect of the tax reform on the behavior of long-term tax-qualified investors is smaller as they are less sensitive to the changes in tax code. Therefore, for dividend-paying stocks, the 2003 Tax Cut brought about a broadening of the investor clienteles, hence the increase in investor heterogeneity.

We employ difference-in-difference approach to identify the influence of investor heterogeneity. The treatment group consists of firms that consistently pay dividends in the 3 years prior to the 2003 Tax Cut, that is, from 2000 to 2002. Since the dividend-paying stocks could be fundamentally different from those nondividend-paying stocks, we select firms that initiate dividends (dividend initiators) in the 2003 fiscal year as the control group. Following the results of Sialm and Starks (2012), the effect of the tax cut on the investor heterogeneity of dividend initiators is expected to be smaller as the incentive of long-term (tax-qualified) funds to invest in these stocks is not affected by the tax law change, whereas short-term (taxable investor) funds are less likely to respond to dividend initiations as dividends are now taxed at a lower rate. To further ensure that the firms in the control group are fundamentally similar, we match each firm in the treatment group (dividend payers before 2003) with a control firm (dividend initiators) on several key firm characteristics using the propensity-score-matching algorithm. Specifically, we compute propensity scores based on a logistic regression using a list of firm characteristics including $\log(\text{SIZE})$, $\log(\text{BM})$, RETQ1-4 (defined as the cumulative monthly stock returns over the past 4 quarters), LOGILLIQ , and STDCR . In addition, we also control for characteristics related to the firm's ex ante propensity to pay dividends in Fama and French (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2004), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). The characteristics that determine the propensity to pay dividends in these models are return on assets, leverage, and idiosyncratic volatility, in addition to $\log(\text{SIZE})$ and $\log(\text{BM})$ (see also Hameed and Xie (2019)). Detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the [Appendix](#). Unreported results confirm that the final sets of stocks in the treatment and control groups are

comparable along these dimensions before the 2003 Tax Cut, justifying the difference-in-difference research design.

We estimate the following difference-in-difference regression using data during the 3 years before and after the 2003 Tax Cut:

$$(4) \quad Y_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TREAT}_{i,q} \times \text{POST}_{i,q} + c\mathbf{M}_{i,q-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_q + e_{i,q},$$

where the dependent variable $Y_{i,q}$ refers to investor heterogeneity in investment horizon (STDCR), stock illiquidity (proxied by LOGILLIQ and 1/TURN), liquidity volatility (proxied by LOGCVILLIQ and LOGCVTURN), or average monthly return of stock i in quarter q , $\text{TREAT}_{i,q}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if stock i consistently pays dividends in the 3 years prior to the 2003 Tax Cut (treatment group) and 0 for the control group, and $\text{POST}_{i,q}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the tax cut (2004–2006), and 0 otherwise. The vector \mathbf{M} stacks all other control variables, including the log(SIZE), log(BM), log(RET_VOL), RETQ1, RETQ2–4, and IO. α_i is the stock dummy to absorb other time-invariant characteristics at the stock level, and γ_q is the year-quarter dummy to absorb the aggregate market factors. Standard errors clustered at both the stock and quarter levels. The coefficient of interest is β_1 , which captures the difference in the dependent variable between the treatment and control groups induced by the implementation of the tax cut.

The results are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Model 1 confirms that the implementation of the 2003 Tax Cut leads to higher investor heterogeneity among the dividend payers. Comparing with the pretreatment period and the control group (i.e., dividend initiators), the tax cut increases the investor heterogeneity by 9.03% (scaled by the standard deviation of STDCR in the matched sample) for the treated firms (i.e., dividend payers). Unreported results show that dividend payers display higher churn rate after the tax reform, confirming that the higher investor heterogeneity for treated firms is due to increased participation of short-term institutions. More importantly, when investor heterogeneity increases due to the tax cut, there is a concurrent decline in stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility in three out of four specifications. For instance, stock illiquidity decreases by 2.81% and 21.73% when measured by LOGILLIQ and 1/TURN, respectively. Similarly, the volatility of trading activity (measured by LOGCVTURN) declines by 10.47%. However, we do not find evidence of change in the volatility of liquidity measured by LOGCVILLIQ.

Using the specification in equation (4), we also estimate the causal impact of STDCR on stock returns. To the extent that higher investor heterogeneity increases stock liquidity, it is possible that it also translates to lower stock returns. However, the estimates in model 6 in Panel A of Table 4 show that there is no distinctive change in the difference of return between the treatment firms and control firms, confirming that the identified changes in investor heterogeneity, stock illiquidity, and liquidity volatility are not mechanically related to other stock characteristics such as return.

To better establish the effect of investor heterogeneity on the decline in stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility following the tax cut, we split the sample into 2 groups of firms. First, we compute the change in average quarterly STDCR from 3 years before to 3 years after the 2003 Tax Cut (denoted ΔSTDCR), and partition

TABLE 4
Difference-in-Difference Estimates Around the 2003 Tax Cut

Panel A of Table 4 presents the difference-in-difference estimates in the following quarterly panel regressions with stock and quarter fixed effects and their corresponding *t*-statistics with standard errors clustered at both the stock and quarter levels, $Y_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TREAT}_{i,q} \times \text{POST}_{i,q} + \mathbf{CM}_{i,q-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_q + \epsilon_{i,q}$, where the dependent variable $Y_{i,q}$ refers to investor heterogeneity in investment horizon ($\Delta\text{STDCR}_{i,q}$), stock illiquidity ($\text{ILLIQ}_{i,q}$), liquidity volatility ($\text{CVILLIQ}_{i,q}$), and average monthly return of stock i in quarter q ; $\text{TREAT}_{i,q}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if stock i consistently pays dividends in the 3 years prior to the 2003 Tax Cut (treatment group), and 0 for the control group; $\text{POST}_{i,q}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 within 3 years after the tax cut (2004–2006), and 0 for 3 years before the tax cut (2000–2002); and the vector \mathbf{M} stacks all other control variables, including the $\log(\text{SIZE})$, $\log(\text{BM})$, $\log(\text{RET_VOL})$, RETQ1 , RETQ2-4 , and IO . α_i and γ_q refer to the stock and quarter fixed effects, respectively. Panels B and C report similar statistics in subsamples with high and low ΔSTDCR , respectively. ΔSTDCR refers to the change in average quarterly STDCR from 3 years before to 3 years after the tax cut, and high (low) ΔSTDCR subsample consists of stocks with above (below) median ΔSTDCR . The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	STDCR	LOGILLIQ	1/TURN	LOGCVILLIQ	LOGCVTURN	RETURN
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Panel A. Difference-in-Difference Estimates Around the 2003 Tax Cut</i>						
TREAT × POST	0.013** (2.71)	-0.088*** (-3.73)	-2.597*** (-7.95)	-0.000 (-0.02)	-0.056*** (-2.98)	0.523 (1.13)
log(SIZE)	-0.002 (-0.64)	-1.246*** (-47.26)	-1.284*** (-5.28)	-0.136*** (-14.39)	-0.104*** (-8.59)	-6.382*** (-10.46)
log(BM)	0.030*** (7.45)	0.292*** (7.71)	2.096*** (4.47)	0.008 (0.82)	0.035** (2.20)	-6.691*** (-6.80)
log(RET_VOL)	0.016*** (4.09)	0.019 (0.94)	-1.138* (-1.99)	-0.078*** (-6.21)	-0.104*** (-6.44)	-0.173 (-0.51)
RETQ1	-0.001 (-0.15)	0.051 (0.75)	1.162 (1.63)	0.023 (0.83)	-0.041* (-1.79)	-3.122*** (-3.88)
RETQ2-4	-0.007** (-2.54)	-0.081** (-2.39)	-0.735** (-2.46)	-0.009 (-1.04)	0.000 (0.03)	-0.693 (-1.24)
IO	0.020** (2.41)	-1.610*** (-10.22)	0.679 (0.50)	-0.212*** (-5.86)	-0.227*** (-4.47)	-0.026* (-1.88)
Adj. R ²	0.621	0.966	0.656	0.687	0.649	0.320
No. of obs.	8,852	8,852	8,852	8,852	8,852	8,852
<i>Panel B. Difference-in-Difference Estimates Around the 2003 Tax Cut (High ΔSTDCR)</i>						
TREAT × POST	0.063*** (5.40)	-0.292** (-2.70)	-3.089*** (-2.86)	-0.075** (-2.57)	-0.121*** (-3.54)	0.640 (1.05)
log(SIZE)	-0.005 (-0.81)	-1.272*** (-17.99)	-1.801 (-1.47)	-0.129*** (-6.42)	-0.100*** (-4.00)	-5.961*** (-7.88)
log(BM)	0.025** (2.34)	0.272*** (3.39)	1.462 (1.68)	0.016 (0.67)	0.037 (1.16)	-6.664*** (-6.61)
log(RET_VOL)	0.019** (2.29)	0.067 (0.78)	-1.033 (-0.99)	-0.054** (-2.50)	-0.058** (-2.57)	-0.299 (-0.65)
RETQ1	0.001 (0.10)	0.053 (0.54)	1.733 (1.39)	0.008 (0.25)	-0.056** (-2.21)	-3.598*** (-4.39)
RETQ2-4	-0.007 (-1.30)	-0.099 (-1.47)	-0.852 (-1.53)	-0.014 (-0.88)	-0.010 (-0.49)	-0.987 (-1.55)
IO	0.003 (0.13)	-1.770*** (-5.56)	-1.290 (-0.52)	-0.161* (-1.92)	-0.171* (-1.77)	-1.405 (-0.94)
Adj. R ²	0.693	0.966	0.624	0.700	0.634	0.326
No. of obs.	4,227	4,227	4,227	4,227	4,227	4,227
<i>Panel C. Difference-in-Difference Estimates Around the 2003 Tax Cut (Low ΔSTDCR)</i>						
TREAT × POST	-0.057*** (-5.14)	0.112 (1.06)	-1.583* (-2.05)	0.050 (1.51)	-0.012 (-0.31)	0.772 (1.32)
log(SIZE)	-0.002 (-0.38)	-1.178*** (-14.71)	-1.227* (-2.04)	-0.141*** (-7.39)	-0.115*** (-4.35)	-6.210*** (-8.25)
log(BM)	0.026*** (3.44)	0.300*** (4.41)	1.788*** (3.17)	0.012 (0.57)	0.049* (1.72)	-6.763*** (-6.33)
log(RET_VOL)	0.008 (1.24)	0.028 (0.52)	-1.726** (-2.52)	-0.066** (-2.70)	-0.124*** (-4.80)	0.225 (0.57)
RETQ1	-0.003 (-0.25)	0.008 (0.11)	0.859 (1.46)	0.023 (0.82)	-0.048 (-1.42)	-2.966*** (-2.84)
RETQ2-4	-0.001 (-0.25)	-0.060 (-1.30)	-0.173 (-0.59)	-0.016 (-1.43)	0.016 (0.87)	-0.844 (-1.53)
IO	0.044 (1.56)	-1.671*** (-5.04)	1.885 (0.66)	-0.313*** (-3.42)	-0.278** (-2.26)	-3.947** (-2.17)
Adj. R ²	0.563	0.968	0.661	0.681	0.646	0.334
No. of obs.	4,401	4,401	4,401	4,401	4,401	4,401

the stocks into 2 subsamples based on whether ΔSTDCR is above or below the median breakpoint. If the effect of tax cut on stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility is influenced by investor heterogeneity, we conjecture that the effect should be more pronounced for the subsample with high ΔSTDCR . We tabulate the results for the subsamples of high and low ΔSTDCR stocks in Panels B and C of Table 4, respectively. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the decline in stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility is concentrated among the stocks that experience a higher increase in investor heterogeneity (high ΔSTDCR), and the results are highly significant in all specifications. For instance, stock illiquidity decreases by 9.34% and 25.84% when measured by LOGILLIQ and 1/TURN, respectively. Similarly, the volatility of stock liquidity and trading activity decline by 18.80% and 22.62% measured by LOGCVILLIQ and LOGCVTURN, respectively. In addition, for dividend payers with low ΔSTDCR , the change in stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility is not significant for all specifications except for one at the 10% level.¹³

Overall, our evidence reveals that an exogenous increase in investor heterogeneity (due to the 2003 Tax Cut) leads to higher future stock liquidity and lower volatility of liquidity.

C. Does Investor Heterogeneity Affect Stock Liquidity Around Extreme Fund Flows?

To further establish the causal effect of investor heterogeneity on stock liquidity, this section shows how the price pressure and subsequent return reversal arising from extreme institutional capital flows would vary across stocks of different investor heterogeneities.

Since open-end mutual funds usually do not maintain significant cash balances given the equity benchmarks they track and rarely take short positions, when outside investors withdraw their capital and mutual funds experience extreme outflows, mutual fund managers are forced to sell some of the existing holdings quickly to cover redemptions. Coval and Stafford (2007) document that when many funds are forced to sell the same security within a short period, the fire sale stock will experience a significant drop in price over the selling period, followed by price reversals which represent compensation to the liquidity providers. The opposite is true for flow-induced purchases (i.e., fire purchases). Therefore, stocks experiencing fire sales are expected to underperform in the immediate (i.e., formation) period due to price pressure, followed by predictable price reversal in the subsequent (i.e., holding) period. Similarly, stocks are expected to experience temporary price increases when experiencing heavy flow-induced purchases, followed by correction of prices in the subsequent period. Hence, a simple liquidity supplying trading strategy that goes long on stocks with extreme negative fund flows and goes short on stocks with extreme positive flows is expected to generate negative returns in the formation period and positive returns in the holding period. We hypothesize that if a heterogeneous investor base helps to mitigate investor-specific liquidity

¹³The results that include additional control variables are presented in Table IA2 in the Supplementary Material.

(or flow-induced) shocks, the contemporaneous price impact and the subsequent reversal due to extreme fund flows should be weaker among firms with high investor heterogeneity.

We investigate the impact of flow-induced mutual fund trading as follows: For each mutual fund f , we compute the monthly fund flow as in equation (1). To match with the quarterly holdings data, we compute quarterly flow as the cumulative monthly flows over the quarter. Following Coval and Stafford (2007), we construct 2 proxies for price pressure at the stock level. The first proxy for price pressure in stock i over quarter q , $PRESSURE_1$, is defined as follows:

$$(5) \text{ PRESSURE_1}_{i,q} = \frac{\sum_f (\max(0, \Delta\text{HOLDINGS}_{f,i,q}) | \text{FLOW}_{f,q} > \text{PCT90}_q) - \sum_f (\max(0, -\Delta\text{HOLDINGS}_{f,i,q}) | \text{FLOW}_{f,q} < \text{PCT10}_q)}{\text{AVG_VOLUME}_{i,q-4:q-2}},$$

where $\Delta\text{HOLDINGS}_{f,i,q}$ refers to the change in the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , $\text{FLOW}_{f,q}$ refers to the fund flow in the same quarter, PCT90_q and PCT10_q refer to the 90th and 10th percentiles of capital flows across all funds in quarter q , and $\text{AVG_VOLUME}_{i,q-4:q-2}$ refers to the average trading volume of stock i during quarters $q-4$ to $q-2$. Stocks with flows below the PCT10 (above the PCT90) are considered to be stocks experiencing fire sales (fire purchases). These stocks with extreme flows relative to their average trading volume are identified to be under price pressure from flow-induced trading by mutual funds. As a robustness check, we consider that a second price pressure proxy, $PRESSURE_2$, is defined as follows:

$$(6) \text{ PRESSURE_2}_{i,q} = \frac{\sum_f (\max(0, \text{FLOW}_{f,q}) \times \max(0, \Delta\text{HOLDINGS}_{f,i,q})) - \sum_f (\max(0, -\text{FLOW}_{f,q}) \times \max(0, -\Delta\text{HOLDINGS}_{f,i,q}))}{\text{AVG_VOLUME}_{i,q-4:q-2}},$$

where all the variables are defined in the same way as in $PRESSURE_1$ above. As explained in Coval and Stafford (2007), $PRESSURE_2$ takes into account both the gravity of the mutual fund flows and the size of the transactions by the mutual funds (relative to the stock trading volume).

At the end of quarter q , stocks are first sorted into deciles according to their lagged quarterly price pressure during quarters $q-4$ to $q-1$. Stocks in the lowest price pressure decile (LOW_PP) experience the largest outflow-induced sales by mutual funds. On the other extreme, stocks in the highest price pressure decile ($HIGH_PP$) are those with the largest inflow-induced purchases. Within each price pressure decile, stocks are further sorted into quintiles according to the heterogeneity in investment horizon of its investors or $STDCR$, in quarter q . The quintile of stocks with the lowest investor heterogeneity is labeled as LOW_IH , whereas the stocks in the highest investor heterogeneity quintile are labeled as $HIGH_IH$. The price impact of extreme fund flows in quarters $q-4$ to $q-1$ and the subsequent reversal of stock returns in quarters $q+1$ to $q+4$ are captured by the following

investment strategy. The strategy involves buying stocks experiencing extreme fund outflow (LOW_PP) and selling stocks experiencing the most severe fund inflow (HIGH_PP), and the returns on the reversal strategy are labeled as LMH_PP. To relate the return reversals arising from flow-induced price pressure to investor heterogeneity, we implement the reversal strategy within each investor heterogeneity (STDCR) sorted quintile.

Table 5 reports the value-weighted average monthly return on the LMH_PP portfolio during the price pressure period (quarters $q - 4$ to $q - 1$), and the investment holding period (quarters $q + 1$ to $q + 4$) for stocks that belong to each of the 5 investor heterogeneity (STDCR) sorted quintiles over the entire sample period from 1982 to 2016. For the holding period returns, we report the raw returns as well as the risk-adjusted returns computed using a 5-factor model that consists of the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors: the market factor (excess return on the value-weighted CRSP market index over the 1 month T-bill rate, MKT), the size factor (small minus big firm return premium, SMB), the book-to-market factor (high book-to-market minus low book-to-market return premium, HML), the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (past winner minus past loser return premium), and the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. As a preview, the key result in Table 5 is that the payoff to the reversal strategy is significantly higher for stocks with low investor heterogeneity, reinforcing our postulation that price pressure arising from forced mutual fund trading increases when the investor base is homogeneous, and therefore lowers stock liquidity and increases liquidity volatility.

Panel A of Table 5 presents the results when price pressure is measured by PRESSURE_1 defined earlier. As expected, when stocks are exposed to severe flow-motivated trading, the difference in returns between fire sale and fire purchase portfolios ("LMH_PP") during the period of price pressure is most negative for firms with the lowest investor heterogeneity. In particular, the fire sale stocks underperform the fire purchase stocks by 0.89% per month when the investor heterogeneity is low (LOW_IH), and this effect is both statistically significant and economically sizable. On the other hand, the fire sale stocks underperform the fire purchase stocks by 0.23% per month when the investor heterogeneity is high (HIGH_IH). The net return difference during the formation period between high and low investor heterogeneity stocks (HML_IH) is significant at 0.66% per month. This contemporaneous price pressure is followed by a strong return reversal in the subsequent year for the LOW_IH stocks. Specifically, for LOW_IH stocks, the fire sale stocks outperform the fire purchase stocks (depicted by LMH_PP) by a significant 0.58% per month in raw return and 0.44% in 5-factor alpha. On the other hand, for the group of stocks with HIGH_IH, we do not find significant predictable reversals during the holding period. The net difference in reversal profits between HIGH_IH and LOW_IH stocks (HML_IH) is also statistically significant at -0.51% per month in raw return and -0.39% in 5-factor alpha.

We obtain similar results using the alternative price pressure measure, PRESSURE_2, as reported in Panel B of Table 5. Stocks with low STDCR are exposed to significantly greater price pressure associated with extreme mutual fund flows than stocks with high STDCR. The subsequent stock return reversals

TABLE 5
Stock Performance Around Extreme Fund Flows

In Panels A and B of Table 5, at the end of quarter q , stocks are first sorted into deciles according to their lagged price pressure between quarters $q-4$ and $q-1$. Within each price pressure group, stocks are further sorted into quintiles according to their lagged investor heterogeneity in investment horizon in quarter q . The Low (High) price pressure portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) decile of stocks based on the quarterly average price pressure between quarters $q-4$ and $q-1$, indicating stocks experiencing outflow-induced sales (inflow-induced purchases). The Low (High) investor heterogeneity portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) quintile of stocks based on the investor heterogeneity in quarter q and is labeled as "LOW_IH" ("HIGH_IH"). This table reports the value-weighted average monthly return in the price pressure period (quarters $q-4$ to $q-1$), as well as the holding period (quarters $q+1$ to $q+4$) for the investment strategy of going long (short) the High (Low) investor heterogeneity stocks ("HML_IH"). The column "LMH_PP" reports the difference in profits between fire sales and fire purchases portfolios. Stock returns are further adjusted by a 5-factor model comprising the 3 Fama-French factors (market, size, and book-to-market), the Carhart momentum factor, and the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. The price pressure is proxied by PRESSURE_1 in Panel A and PRESSURE_2 in Panel B, respectively. Panels C and D report similar statistics when we further control for the past performance. In Panel C, at the end of quarter q , stocks are first sorted into 5×10 portfolios according to their lagged return between quarters $q-8$ and $q-5$ (quintiles) and price pressure between quarters $q-4$ and $q-1$ (deciles). Within each past return-price pressure group, stocks are further sorted into quintiles according to their lagged investor heterogeneity in investment horizon in quarter q . The price pressure is proxied by PRESSURE_1. Panel D reports similar statistics where the lagged return is measured between quarters $q-4$ and $q-1$. The profits are reported for the full sample from 1982 to 2016. The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. Newey-West adjusted t -statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Rank of STDCR	Return				5-Factor Adjusted Return		
	Pressure	Holding Period		LMH_PP	Holding Period		
	LMH_PP	Low	High		Low	High	LMH_PP
<i>Panel A. Returns (in %) Sorted by Extreme Flow-Induced Mutual Fund Transactions (PRESSURE_1) and Investor Heterogeneity</i>							
LOW_IH	-0.886** (-3.70)	0.601** (2.17)	0.021 (0.07)	0.579*** (3.52)	-0.462*** (-4.04)	-0.900*** (-6.51)	0.439*** (3.14)
2	-0.880*** (-2.93)	0.722*** (2.94)	0.215 (0.66)	0.506*** (2.60)	-0.310*** (-3.07)	-0.821*** (-5.39)	0.511*** (2.86)
3	-0.758** (-2.47)	0.785*** (3.27)	0.186 (0.59)	0.599*** (2.87)	-0.249*** (-2.76)	-0.833*** (-5.37)	0.584*** (3.07)
4	-0.469** (-2.17)	0.838*** (3.49)	0.301 (0.96)	0.537** (2.58)	-0.259*** (-2.66)	-0.658*** (-5.05)	0.399** (2.28)
HIGH_IH	-0.230* (-1.92)	0.796*** (2.89)	0.729** (2.25)	0.067 (0.41)	-0.300** (-2.23)	-0.347* (-1.92)	0.048 (0.26)
HML_IH	0.657*** (2.82)	0.195 (1.07)	0.708*** (3.04)	-0.512** (-2.59)	0.162 (0.92)	0.553*** (2.82)	-0.391* (-1.95)
<i>Panel B. Returns (in %) Sorted by Flow-Induced Mutual Fund Transactions (PRESSURE_2) and Investor Heterogeneity</i>							
LOW_IH	-0.598** (-2.26)	1.278*** (4.46)	0.011 (0.03)	1.267*** (6.82)	0.166 (1.27)	-0.966*** (-7.38)	1.131*** (7.02)
2	-0.078 (-0.24)	1.276*** (4.89)	0.039 (0.11)	1.237*** (5.23)	0.161 (1.43)	-1.002*** (-7.13)	1.163*** (5.99)
3	-0.096 (-0.32)	1.131*** (4.74)	0.269 (0.80)	0.862*** (3.66)	0.065 (0.57)	-0.765*** (-4.42)	0.829*** (3.59)
4	0.234 (1.04)	1.209*** (4.89)	0.252 (0.83)	0.957*** (4.56)	0.087 (0.79)	-0.733*** (-5.79)	0.819*** (4.54)
HIGH_IH	0.205 (1.13)	1.098*** (4.74)	0.701** (2.18)	0.397** (2.01)	0.117 (1.06)	-0.428** (-2.40)	0.545*** (2.61)
HML_IH	0.803*** (3.27)	-0.180 (-0.99)	0.690*** (2.84)	-0.870*** (-3.57)	-0.048 (-0.30)	0.538*** (2.65)	-0.586** (-2.37)
<i>Panel C. Returns (in %) Sorted by Extreme Flow-Induced Mutual Fund Transactions (PRESSURE_1) and Investor Heterogeneity (Past Performance-Neutral, $q-8$ to $q-5$)</i>							
LOW_IH	-0.861*** (-3.54)	0.684*** (2.67)	0.057 (0.18)	0.627*** (3.80)	-0.366*** (-3.28)	-0.867*** (-6.20)	0.502*** (3.35)
2	-0.687*** (-3.04)	0.623*** (2.59)	0.221 (0.72)	0.403** (2.38)	-0.427*** (-4.60)	-0.782*** (-5.87)	0.355** (2.37)
3	-0.633** (-2.10)	0.796*** (3.48)	0.194 (0.63)	0.602*** (3.02)	-0.230** (-2.24)	-0.763*** (-4.85)	0.533*** (2.94)
4	-0.508*** (-2.76)	0.836*** (3.47)	0.314 (1.11)	0.522*** (2.81)	-0.228** (-2.30)	-0.616*** (-5.39)	0.388** (2.43)
HIGH_IH	-0.224* (-1.89)	0.737*** (2.70)	0.664** (2.08)	0.073 (0.45)	-0.329** (-2.48)	-0.410** (-2.34)	0.081 (0.46)
HML_IH	0.637** (2.58)	0.053 (0.32)	0.607*** (2.98)	-0.554*** (-2.97)	0.036 (0.21)	0.457*** (2.66)	-0.421** (-2.17)

(continued on next page)

TABLE 5 (continued)
 Stock Performance Around Extreme Fund Flows

Panel D. Returns (in %) Sorted by Extreme Flow-Induced Mutual Fund Transactions (PRESSURE_1) and Investor Heterogeneity (Past Performance-Neutral, $q - 4$ to $q - 1$)

LOW_IH	-0.932*** (-4.35)	0.638** (2.44)	-0.000 (-0.00)	0.638*** (3.57)	-0.380*** (-3.24)	-0.926*** (-7.23)	0.547*** (3.52)
2	-0.639*** (-3.37)	0.741*** (2.96)	0.205 (0.67)	0.536*** (3.39)	-0.294*** (-3.13)	-0.777*** (-5.95)	0.483*** (3.35)
3	-0.513*** (-2.91)	0.828*** (3.62)	0.363 (1.22)	0.465** (2.36)	-0.179* (-1.80)	-0.622*** (-4.65)	0.443** (2.47)
4	-0.455*** (-2.78)	0.773*** (3.25)	0.328 (1.23)	0.444*** (2.86)	-0.292*** (-3.34)	-0.574*** (-4.09)	0.282* (1.68)
HIGH_IH	-0.276* (-1.92)	0.766*** (2.87)	0.644** (2.01)	0.122 (0.77)	-0.317** (-2.42)	-0.447*** (-2.62)	0.130 (0.78)
HML_IH	0.656*** (3.40)	0.128 (0.74)	0.644*** (3.09)	-0.516** (-2.55)	0.062 (0.37)	0.480*** (2.69)	-0.417** (-2.08)

are also higher for low STDCR stocks by 0.59% per month, adjusting for factor exposures.

Hence, stocks with low investor heterogeneity experience greater price pressure emanating from forced trading induced by severe mutual fund flows, followed by strong return reversals in the subsequent period. On the other hand, stocks with a heterogeneous investor base display low price pressure and muted return reversals and, hence, lower liquidity effects.

Since mutual fund investors chase past performance (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Choi and Robertson (2020)), the stock performance in the underlying portfolio could potentially drive the extreme fund flows and also directly affect the stock liquidity and return reversals. As a robustness check, we consider a past performance-neutral trading strategy. Specifically, at the end of quarter q , stocks are first sorted into 5×10 portfolios according to their lagged return between quarters $q - 8$ and $q - 5$ (in quintiles) and price pressure between quarters $q - 4$ and $q - 1$ (in deciles). Within each past return-price pressure group, stocks are further sorted into quintiles according to their lagged investor heterogeneity in investment horizon in quarter q . We focus on the same liquidity supplying trading strategy as described above. This conditional sorting allows us to explicitly control for the past stock performance prior to the extreme fund flows, and thus the portfolios sorted by investor heterogeneity display similar past stock performance, that is, the portfolios are past performance-neutral.

The results are reported in Panel C of Table 5. For brevity, we present results where price pressure is proxied by PRESSURE_1. We find consistent evidence across past performance-neutral portfolios: Stocks with low investor heterogeneity are exposed to more price pressure at the time of extreme fund flows. For instance, the contemporaneous effect of fire sales and fire purchases is a significant -0.86% for stocks with low investor heterogeneity (LOW_IH), but the negative price impact is considerably mitigated and becomes -0.22% for stocks with high investor heterogeneity (HIGH_IH). The net return difference in price pressure between high and low investor heterogeneity stocks (HML_IH) is a large 0.64% per month. The subsequent monthly return reversal for stocks with high investor heterogeneity is

0.55% lower in raw return and 0.42% lower in 5-factor alpha.¹⁴ We also obtain similar results using an alternative past performance-neutral trading strategy, where the lagged return and the price pressure are measured during the same period between quarters $q - 4$ and $q - 1$ (reported in Panel D).

Overall, the empirical findings are in line with our conjecture that a heterogeneous investor base helps absorb investor-specific liquidity shocks (and therefore improves liquidity), reduces the liquidity volatility, and minimizes the price pressure emanating from forced trading by open-end mutual funds.

D. Robustness Tests

We provide 2 sets of robustness tests of the main results on the relation between investor heterogeneity (STDCR) and liquidity (in terms of both level and volatility) in Table 3. First, we show that our findings remain when we control for concentration in institutional ownership, indicating that heterogeneous investment horizon is different from diffused ownership. Second, our results are robust when investor heterogeneity is measured by differences in investment horizon based on stock turnover, fund size, or investment style.

1. Concentration of Ownership

Several studies show that the concentration of institutional ownership affects stock liquidity. Heflin and Shaw (2000) and Gaspar and Massa (2007), for example, find that stocks with greater concentration of ownership are less liquid as large owners may have better access to private information, and consequently increase the information asymmetry. Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009) argue that block ownership reduces trading activity and hence lowers liquidity. We examine if our measure of investor heterogeneity is subsumed by the effect of ownership concentration on stock liquidity. We construct the concentration of institutional ownership of stock i in quarter q ($\text{HHI}_{i,q}$) as the Herfindahl index of all institutions owning the stock:

$$\text{HHI}_{i,q} = \sum_f \left(\text{SHR}_{i,f,q} / \sum_f \text{SHR}_{i,f,q} \right)^2,$$

where $\text{SHR}_{i,f,q}$ refers to the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q . We add to the analyses in Table 3 by including HHI as an additional control variable as well as including the interaction of STDCR and HHI in equation (3). As reported in Table IA4 in the Supplementary Material, a higher concentration of institutional ownership significantly increases the stock's illiquidity and volatility of liquidity but does not alter our main findings on the effects of investor heterogeneity, STDCR.

¹⁴In Table IA3 in the Supplementary Material, we report the value-weighted average monthly portfolio return (LMH_PP) during the investment holding period for stocks that belong to each of the 5 past stock performance sorted quintiles and 5 investor heterogeneity (STDCR) sorted quintiles. We find that the difference in return reversals between high and low investor heterogeneity stocks (HML_IH) remains significantly negative in most past performance quintiles, implying that stocks with low investor heterogeneity experience greater price pressure emanating from forced trading induced by severe mutual fund flows, followed by strong return reversals in the subsequent period. Our findings remain robust to the alternative price pressure measure PRESSURE_2.

2. Alternative Measures of Investor Heterogeneity

Next, we consider three alternative definitions of investor heterogeneity. First, the churn rate measure that we construct to measure the investment horizon of institutions is affected by the stock price changes. We therefore construct a turnover measure for the institutions that is free of stock price fluctuation. Specifically, we first compute the fund-stock-level turnover for stock i held by fund f in a given quarter q as follows: $\widetilde{\text{TO}}_{i,f,q} = |N_{i,f,q} - N_{i,f,q-1}| / \text{SHROUT}_{i,q}$, where $N_{i,f,q}$ refers to the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , and $\text{SHROUT}_{i,q}$ refers to the number of shares outstanding of stock i in quarter q . Next, the turnover of fund f in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $\text{TO}_{f,q} = \sum_{r=1}^4 \widetilde{\text{TO}}_{f,q-r+1} / 4$, where $\text{TO}_{f,q}$ is the investment value-weighted average of the fund-stock-level turnover ($\widetilde{\text{TO}}_{i,f,q}$) across all stocks held by fund f in quarter q .¹⁵ Finally, the heterogeneity in the investment horizon of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $\text{STDTO}_{i,q} = \frac{\text{USTD}\text{TO}_{i,q}}{\text{TO}_{i,q}}$, where $\text{USTD}\text{TO}_{i,q}$ refers to the standard deviation of the turnover of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q , and $\text{TO}_{i,q}$ refers to the average turnover of all funds that hold stock i at the same time.

Second, institutional investors may also vary in their investment strategies or clientele along dimensions other than the investment horizon. For example, funds are frequently stratified into groups based on their investment style (such as growth, value, and momentum funds) or fund size (large and small funds may have different strategies or clientele). To the extent that funds with a similar investment style (or size) are likely to trade in tandem in search of stocks with high expected returns, it is natural to consider fund size and style as alternative measures of investor heterogeneity. Consequently, we consider 2 other proxies of investor heterogeneity in a stock based on the dispersion in its institutional owners' fund size and fund style. One proxy is STDTNA , defined as the standard deviation of the TNA of all mutual funds that hold the stock, scaled by the average TNA across these funds. Another proxy is $\text{STD}\text{STY}\text{TNA}$, defined as the standard deviation of the TNA by fund styles of all mutual funds that hold the stock, scaled by the average TNA across fund styles. The styles of the mutual funds are defined according to Lipper objectives from the CRSP mutual fund database. Both measures capture the dispersion in investor types based on cross-sectional dispersion in fund size and fund style. Given the wide differences in investment strategies related to fund size and fund style, these funds are likely to have similar trading needs within the group but differ in demand for liquidity across groups. For instance, large funds trade their portfolios less often than small funds (e.g., Busse, Chordia, Jiang, and Tang (2021)).

As reported in Table 6, the estimates of equation (3) using alternative measures of investor heterogeneity show a similar statistical and economic impact as STDCR in Table 3: A higher investor heterogeneity significantly decreases stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility. For instance, a 1-standard-deviation increase in STDTO (STDTNA , $\text{STD}\text{STY}\text{TNA}$) translates to 0.31% (3.05%, 1.01%) lower illiquidity (LOGILLIQ) and 1.58% (7.47%, 2.14%) lower inverse of trading activity ($1/\text{TURN}$). Similarly, when STDTO (STDTNA , $\text{STD}\text{STY}\text{TNA}$) is increased by

¹⁵We compute the average turnover over the past 4 quarters to be consistent with our main measure of CR and STDCR . In Panel B of Table IA5 in the Supplementary Material, we report results using turnover from past quarter or 2 quarters and obtain similar findings.

TABLE 6

Alternative Measures of Investor Heterogeneity

Table 6 presents the results of the following quarterly Fama–MacBeth regressions, as well as their corresponding Newey–West adjusted t -statistics, $ILLIQ_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 IH_{i,q-1} + \mathbf{cM}_{i,q-1} + e_{i,q}$, $CVILLIQ_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 IH_{i,q-1} + e_{i,q}$, where $ILLIQ_{i,q}$ refers to the 2 stock illiquidity proxies $LOGILLIQ_{i,q}$ and $1/TURN_{i,q}$ of stock i in quarter q ; $CVILLIQ_{i,q}$ refers to the 2 stock liquidity volatility proxies $LOGCVILLIQ_{i,q}$ and $LOGCVTURN_{i,q}$; $IH_{i,q-1}$ refers to the 3 investor heterogeneity proxies including $STDTO_{i,q-1}$, $STDSTYTNA_{i,q-1}$, and $STDSTYTNAL_{i,q-1}$; and the vector \mathbf{M} stacks all other control variables, including the $\log(\text{SIZE})$, $\log(\text{BM})$, $\log(\text{RET_VOL})$, RETQ1 , RETQ2-4 , and IO . $\text{AR}(1)$ refers to the lagged dependent variable. The sample period is from 1982 to 2016. The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	Stock Liquidity and Liquidity Volatility Regressed on Lagged Investor Heterogeneity											
	LOGILLIQ			1/TURN			LOGCVILLIQ			LOGCVTURN		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
STDTO	-0.011** (-2.44)			-0.365*** (-2.97)			-0.007* (-1.91)			-0.019*** (-3.98)		
STDSTYTNA		-0.066*** (-8.86)			-1.053*** (-12.13)			-0.041*** (-8.36)			-0.064*** (-10.82)	
log(SIZE)	-0.213*** (-21.99)	-0.222*** (-19.98)	-0.212*** (-24.67)	-0.168*** (-3.56)	0.025 (0.81)	-0.087*** (-2.63)	-0.056*** (-32.12)	-0.054*** (-29.55)	-0.058*** (-18.51)	-0.105*** (-48.00)	-0.102*** (-61.88)	-0.106*** (-38.05)
log(BM)	0.024*** (5.35)	0.021*** (4.34)	0.020*** (4.16)	0.546*** (7.58)	0.430*** (7.31)	0.331*** (7.33)	-0.004** (-2.20)	-0.005*** (-3.00)	-0.002 (-1.25)	0.013*** (3.80)	0.010** (2.52)	0.012*** (3.22)
log(RET_VOL)	-0.062*** (-5.53)	-0.056*** (-5.13)	-0.062*** (-5.32)	0.718*** (4.39)	0.727*** (4.44)	0.559*** (3.72)	-0.014* (-1.97)	-0.013* (-1.67)	-0.015* (-1.91)	-0.086*** (-11.88)	-0.080*** (-11.07)	-0.088*** (-11.46)
RETQ1	-0.507*** (-20.78)	-0.505*** (-21.24)	-0.506*** (-21.59)	1.992*** (5.55)	1.605*** (5.60)	1.305*** (5.34)	-0.038*** (-5.45)	-0.036*** (-5.09)	-0.029*** (-3.68)	0.017* (1.78)	0.012 (1.26)	0.019** (2.05)
RETQ2-4	-0.039*** (-4.75)	-0.039*** (-4.41)	-0.042*** (-5.08)	0.015 (0.11)	-0.024 (-0.17)	-0.135 (-1.49)	-0.011** (-2.60)	-0.008** (-2.09)	-0.008* (-1.89)	0.002 (0.40)	0.001 (1.10)	0.003 (0.55)
IO	-0.354*** (-14.57)	-0.288*** (-14.03)	-0.319*** (-13.61)	-6.192*** (-10.37)	-4.486*** (-10.48)	-4.755*** (-12.58)	-0.101*** (-5.99)	-0.047*** (-3.90)	-0.086*** (-5.09)	-0.159*** (-7.05)	-0.069*** (-4.43)	-0.138*** (-6.81)
AR(1)	0.843*** (128.54)	0.829*** (97.63)	0.840*** (126.84)	0.771*** (60.90)	0.758*** (61.47)	0.763*** (67.83)	0.523*** (33.79)	0.492*** (37.12)	0.510*** (33.18)	0.389*** (42.55)	0.354*** (29.81)	0.370*** (40.27)
Intercept	0.957*** (19.74)	1.073*** (15.25)	0.997*** (19.02)	6.589*** (11.22)	6.196*** (15.32)	5.901*** (16.19)	0.503*** (32.68)	0.572*** (39.64)	0.554*** (42.43)	0.758*** (38.90)	0.829*** (48.23)	0.810*** (65.51)
Adj. R^2	0.969	0.970	0.969	0.693	0.695	0.687	0.594	0.599	0.595	0.577	0.571	0.554
No. of quarters	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
No. of obs.	228,196	218,020	205,557	228,255	218,032	205,559	228,181	218,017	205,557	228,255	218,032	205,559

1 standard deviation, the volatility of liquidity (LOGCVILLIQ) decreases by 1.48% (14.24%, 4.02%) and the volatility of trading activity (LOGCVTURN) decreases by 3.04% (16.79%, 5.62%).

Overall, we document the compelling evidence that an increase in the heterogeneity of a stock's investor base reduces the stock's illiquidity and volatility of liquidity.

IV. Investor Heterogeneity and Illiquidity Premium

The above results deliver a message that a heterogeneous investor base improves the stock liquidity and reduces the liquidity volatility. This finding is particularly stronger in the post-2000 period when the U.S. stock market experienced both higher liquidity and more diverse investor participation. We move on to investigate the link between investor heterogeneity and the price of illiquidity. The seminal article by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) shows that differences in liquidity have important price implications and investors demand a premium for holding illiquid assets. Empirical evidence further confirms that stock illiquidity as a characteristic is positively priced in the United States and around the world (e.g., Amihud (2002), Amihud, Hameed, Kang, and Zhang (2015)). Ben-Rephael, Kadan, and Wohl (2015) argue that the liquidity premium in the U.S. market has declined drastically over time. For example, they show that the average liquidity premium based on the Amihud illiquidity measure was significant in the pre-2000 period and has become insignificant in the post-2000 period. Our objective here is to investigate if liquidity premium depends on the heterogeneity in the investor base. Specifically, we examine if investors in stocks with lower investor heterogeneity require a higher premium for stock illiquidity. Our conjecture is that the level of stock illiquidity is a bigger concern among stocks with homogeneous investors, and the stock price is more likely to reflect a premium for illiquidity given their exposure to liquidity shocks arising from similar trading needs of its investor base.

A. Analysis Based on Portfolio Returns

We start by performing a portfolio-based analysis. At the end of quarter q , stocks are sorted into quintiles according to their Amihud illiquidity (LOGILLIQ) and the level of investor heterogeneity in investment horizon (STDCR) in quarter q into quintiles. This process of independently sorting stocks based on LOGILLIQ and STDCR in quarter q generates 25 (i.e., 5×5) portfolios. We then compute the monthly future returns (i.e., in quarter $q + 1$) on a portfolio that is long the high illiquidity stocks (i.e., buy HIGH_ILLIQ quintile) and short the low illiquidity stocks (i.e., sell LOW_ILLIQ quintile) within each of the 5 STDCR sorted stock quintiles. The return on the HIGH_ILLIQ minus LOW_ILLIQ or Illiquid-minus-Liquid (IML) portfolio represents the premium for illiquidity within each STDCR ranked group. We also compute the IML portfolio return across all stocks in the sample to gauge the average liquidity premium. In addition to the raw portfolio returns, we report alphas from a 5-factor model that consists of the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and the Pástor and

Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The standard errors in all the estimations are corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method.

In Panel A1 of Table 7, the average (equal-weighted) illiquidity premium (IML) across all stocks (column labeled “All”) is insignificant in raw return. However, the 5-factor risk-adjusted alpha on the IML portfolio becomes significantly positive at 0.28% per month (or 3.30% per annum). Interestingly, the illiquidity return premium is much stronger among stocks with low investor heterogeneity (LOW_IH). For instance, illiquid stocks outperform liquid stocks by 0.66% per month in raw return, and the magnitude increases to 1.03% per month (12.32% per annum) in 5-factor alpha if the stock’s institutional investors have similar investment horizon. On the other extreme, stocks in the HIGH_IH quintile display a small, insignificant IML alpha of 0.18% per month. Hence, the premium for illiquidity emerges to be the highest among stocks with low investor heterogeneity, and the difference in illiquidity premium between low and high investor heterogeneity groups is economically large.

Focusing on the recent subperiod from 2000 to 2016 in Panel A2 of Table 7, the relationship between investor heterogeneity and illiquidity premium becomes stronger. The unconditional, 5-factor risk-adjusted illiquidity premium remains low in recent years at 0.31% per month, and this is consistent with the findings of Ben-Rephael et al. (2015). More important for our analyses, the risk-adjusted liquidity premium among stocks with low investor heterogeneity (LOW_IH) is economically large at 1.44% per month. Moreover, this illiquidity premium is primarily driven by low returns on liquid stocks held by investors with homogeneous investment horizon. On the other hand, the high investor heterogeneity firms (HIGH_IH) continue to display an insignificant price for differences in illiquidity. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that a heterogeneous investor base helps facilitate liquidity provision, and hence reduces the effect of the level of stock illiquidity as a characteristic in predicting expected returns.

Since stocks that are plentiful but tiny in aggregate market value may dominate equal-weighted portfolio returns, Panel B of Table 7 reports value-weighted portfolio returns as a robustness check. We obtain qualitatively similar results. Stocks with low investor heterogeneity (LOW_IH) display a positive and significant 5-factor risk-adjusted monthly illiquidity premium (IML) of 0.96% in the full sample. This illiquidity premium increases to 1.67% per month (or 20.03% per year) in the recent 2000–2016 subperiod.¹⁶ The robust relation between illiquidity premium and investor heterogeneity together with the large economic magnitude point to the important role played by the diversity of shareholders’ investment horizon and trading needs on the price of illiquidity.

Next, we examine if the cross-sectional relation between illiquidity premium and investor heterogeneity is affected by cross-firm variation in liquidity volatility.

¹⁶We also confirm that the illiquidity gap between low and high illiquidity stocks in Table 7 is similar across STDCR groups. This is expected given that these portfolios are formed by independently sorting stocks by illiquidity and STDCR. To address the potential concern that STDCR also captures stock liquidity, we conduct a conditional sort first by LOGILLIQ then by STDCR to control for the liquidity level. Unreported results confirm our main findings in Table 7.

TABLE 7
Investor Heterogeneity and Illiquidity Premium

At the end of quarter q , stocks are sorted into quintiles according to their Amihud illiquidity (LOGILLIQ) and investor heterogeneity in investment horizon (STDCR) in that quarter. In Table 7, the Low (High) stock illiquidity portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) quintile of stocks based on the Amihud illiquidity and is labeled as "LOW_ILLIQ" ("HIGH_ILLIQ"). The Low (High) investor heterogeneity portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) quintile of stocks based on the investor heterogeneity and is labeled as "LOW_IH" ("HIGH_IH"). Panel A reports, for each investor heterogeneity portfolio and All firms, the equal-weighted average monthly return in quarter $q + 1$ for the investment strategy of going long (short) the illiquid (liquid) stocks ("IML"). Stock returns are further adjusted by a 5-factor model comprising the 3 Fama–French factors (market, size, and book-to-market), the Carhart momentum factor, and the Pastor–Stambaugh liquidity factor. Panel B reports similar statistics for value-weighted portfolio returns. Panels A1 and B1 focus on the entire sample period from 1982 to 2016, whereas Panels A2 and B2 focus on the subperiod from 2000 to 2016. The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. Newey–West adjusted t -statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Rank of LOGILLIQ	Return						5-Factor Adjusted Return					
	Rank of STDCR						Rank of STDCR					
	LOW_IH	2	3	4	HIGH_IH	All	LOW_IH	2	3	4	HIGH_IH	All
<i>Panel A. Equal-Weighted Illiquidity Return Premium (in %) Sorted by Investor Heterogeneity</i>												
<i>Panel A1. 1982–2016</i>												
LOW_ILLIQ	0.430 (0.99)	0.889*** (2.65)	1.148*** (4.30)	1.054*** (4.40)	1.103*** (4.92)	1.043*** (4.25)	−0.772*** (−2.99)	−0.220* (−1.91)	0.038 (0.51)	−0.017 (−0.31)	0.113* (1.84)	−0.023 (−0.51)
HIGH_ILLIQ	1.085*** (4.39)	1.113*** (4.09)	1.137*** (4.03)	1.173*** (4.40)	1.174*** (4.56)	1.126*** (4.48)	0.254* (1.84)	0.180 (1.34)	0.201 (1.37)	0.260* (1.96)	0.297** (2.19)	0.252** (2.03)
IML	0.655* (1.73)	0.224 (0.98)	−0.010 (−0.06)	0.119 (0.73)	0.072 (0.45)	0.083 (0.56)	1.027*** (3.40)	0.401** (2.47)	0.163 (0.96)	0.277* (1.93)	0.184 (1.38)	0.275** (2.16)
<i>Panel A2. 2000–2016</i>												
LOW_ILLIQ	−0.438 (−0.69)	0.389 (0.80)	0.749* (1.79)	0.747** (2.01)	0.835** (2.35)	0.701* (1.86)	−1.038*** (−3.31)	−0.225 (−1.35)	0.097 (0.81)	0.099 (1.08)	0.245*** (2.89)	0.073 (1.03)
HIGH_ILLIQ	0.980*** (3.11)	1.027*** (2.63)	1.040*** (2.60)	1.040*** (2.80)	1.085*** (3.14)	1.004*** (3.04)	0.403** (2.22)	0.332* (1.75)	0.303 (1.46)	0.357* (1.83)	0.464** (2.41)	0.379** (2.36)
IML	1.418** (2.54)	0.638* (1.72)	0.291 (1.01)	0.292 (1.16)	0.250 (1.19)	0.304 (1.42)	1.442*** (3.89)	0.557** (2.46)	0.206 (0.92)	0.258 (1.18)	0.219 (1.11)	0.306* (1.83)

(continued on next page)

TABLE 7 (continued)
Investor Heterogeneity and Illiquidity Premium

Panel B. Value-Weighted Illiquidity Return Premium (in %) Sorted by Investor Heterogeneity

Panel B1. 1982–2016

LOW_ILLIQ	0.596 (1.35)	0.934** (2.53)	1.044*** (3.55)	1.007*** (4.18)	0.983*** (4.80)	0.997*** (4.48)	−0.648** (−2.16)	−0.172 (−1.16)	−0.097 (−0.93)	−0.065 (−1.07)	0.055 (1.22)	−0.001 (−0.06)
HIGH_ILLIQ	1.177*** (5.01)	1.053*** (3.94)	1.141*** (3.98)	1.271*** (4.79)	1.117*** (4.16)	1.143*** (4.78)	0.310** (2.56)	0.066 (0.49)	0.101 (0.74)	0.368*** (2.74)	0.185 (1.19)	0.222** (2.27)
IML	0.581 (1.49)	0.119 (0.40)	0.097 (0.42)	0.264 (1.31)	0.133 (0.64)	0.146 (0.89)	0.957*** (2.75)	0.238 (1.16)	0.198 (1.12)	0.433*** (2.77)	0.131 (0.83)	0.222** (2.23)

Panel B2. 2000–2016

LOW_ILLIQ	−0.544 (−0.82)	0.320 (0.56)	0.489 (1.06)	0.467 (1.28)	0.473 (1.53)	0.476 (1.43)	−1.191*** (−3.41)	−0.233 (−1.06)	−0.129 (−0.82)	−0.098 (−1.17)	0.041 (0.77)	−0.001 (−0.06)
HIGH_ILLIQ	1.083*** (3.54)	0.848** (2.10)	1.018** (2.40)	1.140*** (3.04)	1.030*** (2.67)	1.004*** (3.14)	0.478*** (2.91)	0.094 (0.45)	0.185 (0.92)	0.430** (2.03)	0.332 (1.28)	0.324** (2.57)
IML	1.627*** (2.86)	0.528 (1.02)	0.530 (1.48)	0.673** (2.25)	0.557* (1.80)	0.528** (2.34)	1.669*** (4.13)	0.326 (1.04)	0.313 (1.38)	0.528** (2.20)	0.291 (1.14)	0.325** (2.54)

TABLE 8
Investor Heterogeneity, Liquidity Volatility, and Illiquidity Premium

At the end of quarter q , stocks are sorted into quintiles according to their Amihud illiquidity (LOGILLIQ), liquidity volatility (LOGCVILLIQ), and investor heterogeneity in investment horizon (STDCR) in that quarter. In Table 8, the Low (High) stock illiquidity portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) quintile of stocks based on the Amihud illiquidity and is labeled as "LOW_ILLIQ" ("HIGH_ILLIQ"). The Low (High) stock liquidity volatility portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) quintile of stocks based on the coefficient of variation of Amihud illiquidity and is labeled as "LOW_CVILLIQ" ("HIGH_CVILLIQ"). The Low (High) investor heterogeneity portfolio is comprised of the bottom (top) quintile of stocks based on the investor heterogeneity and is labeled as "LOW_IH" ("HIGH_IH"). Panel A reports the equal-weighted average monthly return in quarter $q + 1$ for the investment strategy of going long (short) the illiquid (liquid) stocks ("IML") over the entire sample period from 1982 to 2016. Stock returns are further adjusted by a 5-factor model comprising the 3 Fama–French factors (market, size, and book-to-market), the Carhart momentum factor, and the Pastor–Stambaugh liquidity factor. Panel B reports similar statistics for value-weighted portfolio returns. The Appendix provides the detailed definition of each variable. Newey–West adjusted t -statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Rank of LOGILLIQ	Return				5-Factor Adjusted Return			
	LOW_IH		HIGH_IH		LOW_IH		HIGH_IH	
	LOW_CVILLIQ	HIGH_CVILLIQ	LOW_CVILLIQ	HIGH_CVILLIQ	LOW_CVILLIQ	HIGH_CVILLIQ	LOW_CVILLIQ	HIGH_CVILLIQ
<i>Panel A. Equal-Weighted Illiquidity Return Premium (in %) Sorted by Liquidity Volatility and Investor Heterogeneity</i>								
LOW_ILLIQ	-0.116 (-0.23)	0.006 (0.03)	1.106*** (4.87)	0.803*** (4.58)	-1.165*** (-3.02)	-0.761* (-1.76)	0.110 (1.62)	0.319* (1.94)
HIGH_ILLIQ	1.061*** (3.00)	1.104*** (4.22)	0.126 (0.31)	1.251*** (4.96)	0.226 (0.67)	0.285* (1.80)	-0.321 (-0.78)	0.399*** (3.07)
IML	1.178** (2.07)	1.097*** (3.56)	-0.980** (-2.39)	0.448* (1.77)	1.391*** (2.84)	1.046** (2.53)	-0.431 (-1.06)	0.080 (0.38)
<i>Panel B. Value-Weighted Illiquidity Return Premium (in %) Sorted by Liquidity Volatility and Investor Heterogeneity</i>								
LOW_ILLIQ	0.068 (0.13)	-0.004 (-0.02)	1.001*** (4.87)	0.661*** (3.91)	-1.013** (-2.41)	-0.768* (-1.77)	0.071 (1.25)	0.182 (1.09)
HIGH_ILLIQ	1.095*** (3.08)	1.197*** (4.77)	0.077 (0.18)	1.173*** (4.81)	0.286 (0.82)	0.331** (2.27)	-0.325 (-0.78)	0.252** (1.98)
IML	1.027* (1.78)	1.201*** (3.97)	-0.924** (-2.23)	0.512** (2.12)	1.299** (2.47)	1.100*** (2.70)	-0.396 (-0.95)	0.070 (0.36)

At the end of quarter q , stocks are independently sorted into quintiles according to their Amihud illiquidity (LOGILLIQ), liquidity volatility (LOGCVILLIQ), and investor heterogeneity in investment horizon (STDCR) in that quarter. This generates a total of 125 (i.e., $5 \times 5 \times 5$) portfolios sorted by LOGILLIQ, LOGCVILLIQ, and STDCR. Using the average monthly returns on these 125 portfolios in quarter $q + 1$, we compute the illiquidity premium (i.e., high LOGILLIQ minus low LOGILLIQ quintiles, labeled IML) for stocks in the intersection of low/high quintiles based on LOGCVILLIQ and STDCR characteristics.

Panel A of Table 8 reports that despite the variations in liquidity volatility, stocks with low investor heterogeneity (LOW_IH) consistently display significant equal-weighted monthly 5-factor-adjusted illiquidity premium of above 1%. The corresponding monthly 5-factor-adjusted illiquidity premium is not significantly different from 0 for stocks with high investor heterogeneity (HIGH_IH), independent of the level of liquidity volatility. We obtain similar findings in Panel B of when stock returns are value-weighted. For instance, the monthly, value-weighted 5-factor-adjusted illiquidity premium is also economically large at 1.30% (1.10%) for LOW_IH stocks with low (high) liquidity volatility. This suggests a smaller role for liquidity volatility in the pricing of the level of stock illiquidity. Overall, our findings consistently point to the effect of the diversity of the investor base on stock illiquidity and its pricing. The level of stock illiquidity is primarily priced among

stocks with homogeneous investors, given their exposure to liquidity shocks arising from similar trading needs of the investor base.

B. Fama–MacBeth Regressions

As a robustness check of the portfolio results, we explicitly control for other firm characteristics and estimate the following multivariate specification:

$$(7) \quad \text{PERF}_{i,q} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{DUMMY}(\text{STDCR})_{i,q-1} + \beta_2 \text{DUMMY}(\text{STDCR})_{i,q-1} \\ \times \text{ILLIQ}_{i,q-1} + \beta_3 \text{ILLIQ}_{i,q-1} + c\mathbf{M}_{i,q-1} + e_{i,q},$$

where $\text{PERF}_{i,q}$ refers to the average monthly return of stock i in quarter q ; $\text{DUMMY}(\text{STDCR})_{i,q-1}$ refers to 2 dummy variables for stock i in quarter $q-1$: $\text{LOW_STDCR}_{i,q-1}$ (takes a value of 1 if the $\text{STDCR}_{i,q-1}$ is in the bottom quintile, and 0 otherwise) and $\text{HIGH_STDCR}_{i,q-1}$ (takes a value of 1 if the $\text{STDCR}_{i,q-1}$ is in the top quintile, and 0 otherwise); and $\text{STDCR}_{i,q-1}$ refers to the investor heterogeneity in the investment horizon. $\text{ILLIQ}_{i,q-1}$ refers to the stock Amihud illiquidity (LOGILLIQ). The vector \mathbf{M} stacks all other control variables, including the LOGCVILLIQ , $\log(\text{SIZE})$, $\log(\text{BM})$, $\log(\text{RET_VOL})$, RETQ1 , RETQ2-4 , and IO .

We consider regressions based on raw stock returns as well as stock returns adjusted for the exposure to size, book-to-market, and momentum (past 1-year return) characteristics per the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) model.¹⁷ The results are reported in Table IA6 in the Supplementary Material. Our main finding holds across different specifications: Illiquid stocks earn higher expected returns particularly when the investor base is not diversified, and is robust to controlling for various stock characteristics that explain the cross section of stock returns. In particular, the interaction term $\text{LOW_STDCR} \times \text{LOGILLIQ}$ is positively associated with stock returns in the subsequent quarter. In contrast, the interaction term $\text{HIGH_STDCR} \times \text{LOGILLIQ}$ does not predict stock returns. Hence, stock illiquidity premium is concentrated in stocks with low investor heterogeneity.

To summarize, we find that stocks held by institutional investors with similar investment horizon are associated with higher illiquidity, higher liquidity volatility, and greater exposure to liquidity shocks arising from extreme fund flows. We also document that the premium for illiquidity is concentrated in stocks with homogeneous investor base. The overall findings suggest that the heterogeneity of the stock's investor base plays a critical role in affecting stock liquidity (both level and volatility) and the pricing of stock illiquidity.

V. Conclusion

Institutional investors represent an increasing fraction of equity ownership over the last few decades, and this has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in share turnover. In addition, there has been a sharp growth in the diversity of institutional

¹⁷In estimating the regression model, we skip 1 month between quarters q and $q-1$, that is, for STDCR measured at the end of March, we compute average monthly stock return from May to July. Our findings remain the same if we do not skip 1 month.

investors and investment strategies. For example, although a lot of institutional investors are of short-term investment horizon, many others tend to be long-horizon investors. Our article represents the first study to examine how the composition of short-term and long-term institutions will affect the liquidity and liquidity volatility.

We start with the result that fund flows to institutional investors are highly correlated with flows to other funds that share similar investment horizon, and have low comovement with flows to funds that have different horizons. This implies that stocks held by homogenous investors tend to face highly correlated order flows and a more heterogeneous investor base facilitates the accommodation of investor-specific flow or liquidity shocks. Consistent with this conjecture, the heterogeneity of investment horizon among investors holding a stock is negatively related to stock illiquidity. We find that investor heterogeneity (proxied by the standard deviation of the portfolio churn rate across institutional investors holding a stock) is negatively related to the stock illiquidity and the volatility of liquidity, whereby the illiquidity measures are constructed based on the price impact measure of Amihud (2002) and the trading activity measure based on the inverse of stock turnover. This relationship is especially strong in the recent post-2000 period with growing participation and diversity of institutional investors and investment strategies.

We report confirmatory evidence using two settings that help identify the effect of investor heterogeneity on liquidity. First, we use the 2003 dividend tax cut as an exogenous shock to examine the impact of investor heterogeneity on liquidity. We find that stocks that have been paying dividends prior to 2003 register an increase in investor heterogeneity and, consequently, experience an improvement in stock liquidity. Second, we find that stocks with less heterogeneous investors suffer bigger price pressure associated with fire sales by mutual funds. We find that a heterogeneous investor base improves liquidity and reduces the volatility of liquidity by absorbing liquidity shocks emanating from some investor types. In addition, we find that the illiquidity premium is concentrated among stocks with low investor heterogeneity.

With institutional investors representing a growing fraction of equity ownership and an even larger proportion of trading activities, it is important to understand their influences on financial markets. We show that a balanced composition of short-term and long-term institutions, reflecting a higher degree of investor heterogeneity, will help reduce stock illiquidity and liquidity volatility. Therefore, it is desirable for companies to attract a variety of institutions to hold the shares, which helps to improve stock liquidity and reduce the cost of equity capital.

Appendix. Variable Definitions

Investor Heterogeneity Measures

STDCR: The heterogeneity in investment horizon of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $STDCR_{i,q} = \frac{USTDCR_{i,q}}{CR_{i,q}}$, where $USTDCR_{i,q}$ refers to the standard deviation of the churn rate of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q , and $CR_{i,q}$ refers to the average churn rate of all funds that hold stock i at the same time. The churn rate of fund f in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $CR_{f,q} = \sum_{r=1}^4 \widehat{CR}_{f,q-r+1}/4$, and $CR_{f,q} = \sum_{i \in S} |N_{i,f,q} P_{i,q} - N_{i,f,q-1} P_{i,q-1} - N_{i,f,q-1} \Delta P_{i,q}| / \sum_{i \in S} [(N_{i,f,q} P_{i,q} +$

$N_{i,f,q-1}P_{i,q-1})/2]$, where S refers to the set of companies held by fund f , and $P_{i,q}$ and $N_{i,f,q}$ refer to the price and the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , respectively, following Gaspar et al. (2005).

USTDCR: The standard deviation of the churn rate of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q (USTDCR $_{i,q}$), defined the same as in STDCR above.

CR: The average churn rate of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q (CR $_{i,q}$), defined the same as in STDCR above.

STDTO: The heterogeneity in investment horizon of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows: STDTO $_{i,q} = \frac{\text{USTD}\text{TO}_{i,q}}{\text{TO}_{i,q}}$, where USTDTO $_{i,q}$ refers to the standard deviation of the turnover of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q , and TO $_{i,q}$ refers to the average turnover of all funds that hold stock i at the same time. The turnover of fund f in a given quarter q is computed as follows: TO $_{f,q} = \sum_{r=1}^4 \widetilde{\text{TO}}_{f,q-r+1}/4$, where $\widetilde{\text{TO}}_{f,q}$ refers to the investment value-weighted average of the fund-stock-level turnover ($\widetilde{\text{TO}}_{i,f,q}$) across all stocks held by the fund. $\widetilde{\text{TO}}_{i,f,q} = |N_{i,f,q} - N_{i,f,q-1}|/\text{SHROUT}_{i,q}$, where $N_{i,f,q}$ refers to the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , and SHROUT $_{i,q}$ refers to the number of shares outstanding of stock i in quarter q .

STDNTA: The heterogeneity in fund size of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows: STDNTA $_{i,q} = \frac{\text{STDEV}(\text{TNA}_{i,q})}{\text{TNA}_{i,q}}$, where STDEV(TNA $_{i,q}$) refers to the standard deviation of the total net assets (TNA) of all funds that hold stock i in quarter q , and TNA $_{i,q}$ refers to the average TNA of all funds that hold stock i at the same time.

STDSTYNTA: The heterogeneity in style size of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows: STDSTYNTA $_{i,q} = \frac{\text{STDEV}(\text{STYNTA}_{i,q})}{\text{STYNTA}_{i,q}}$, where STDEV(STYNTA $_{i,q}$) refers to the standard deviation of the TNA of all fund styles that hold stock i in quarter q , and STYNTA $_{i,q}$ refers to the average TNA of all fund styles that hold stock i at the same time.

Liquidity and Liquidity Volatility Measures

LOGILLIQ: The logarithm of the stock illiquidity and the stock illiquidity measure in a given quarter q is computed as follows: ILLIQ $_{i,q} = \left(\sum_{d \in q} |R_{i,q,d}| / \text{VOLD}_{i,q,d} \right) / D_{i,q} \times 10^6$, where $R_{i,q,d}$ refers to the return of stock i in day d of quarter q , VOLD $_{i,q,d}$ refers to the dollar trading volume at the same time, and $D_{i,q}$ is the number of trading days for stock i in quarter q , following Amihud (2002). In addition, NASDAQ trading volume is adjusted following Gao and Ritter (2010).

1/TURN: The inverse of the stock turnover, and the stock turnover measure in a given quarter q is computed as follows: TURN $_{i,q} = \left(\sum_{d \in q} \text{VOL}_{i,q,d} / \text{SHROUT}_{i,q,d} \right) / D_{i,q} \times 10^2$, where VOL $_{i,q,d}$ refers to the trading volume of stock i in day d of quarter q , SHROUT $_{i,q,d}$ refers to the shares outstanding at the same time, and $D_{i,q}$ is the number of trading days for stock i in quarter q . In addition, NASDAQ trading volume is adjusted following Gao and Ritter (2010).

LOGCVILLIQ: The logarithm of the coefficient of variation of illiquidity, and the coefficient of variation of illiquidity measure in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $CVILLIQ_{i,q} = \frac{STDEV(ILLIQ_{i,q})}{ILLIQ_{i,q}}$, where $STDEV(ILLIQ_{i,q})$ refers to the standard deviation of the daily illiquidity of stock i in quarter q , and $ILLIQ_{i,q}$ refers to the average daily illiquidity of stock i at the same time. The stock illiquidity is defined the same as in LOGILLIQ above.

LOGCVTURN: The logarithm of the coefficient of variation of turnover, and the coefficient of variation of turnover measure in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $CVTURN_{i,q} = \frac{STDEV(TURN_{i,q})}{TURN_{i,q}}$, where $STDEV(TURN_{i,q})$ refers to the standard deviation of the daily turnover of stock i in quarter q , and $TURN_{i,q}$ refers to the average daily turnover of stock i at the same time. The stock turnover is defined the same as in $1/TURN$ above.

Stock Characteristics

PRESSURE_1: The fraction of average volume from extreme flow-motivated trading of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows:

$$PRESSURE_1_{i,q} = \frac{\sum_f (\max(0, \Delta HOLDINGS_{f,i,q}) | FLOW_{f,q} > PCT90_q) - \sum_f (\max(0, -\Delta HOLDINGS_{f,i,q}) | FLOW_{f,q} < PCT10_q)}{AVG_VOLUME_{i,q-4;q-2}},$$

where $\Delta HOLDINGS_{f,i,q}$ refers to the change in the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , $FLOW_{f,q}$ refers to the fund flow in the same quarter, $PCT90_q$ and $PCT10_q$ refer to the 90th and 10th percentiles of flow across all funds in quarter q , and $AVG_VOLUME_{i,q-4;q-2}$ refers to the average trading volume of stock i between quarters $q-4$ and $q-2$, following Coval and Stafford (2007). Fund flow in a given month m is computed as follows: $FLOW_{f,m} = [TNA_{f,m} - TNA_{f,m-1} \times (1 + r_{f,m})] / TNA_{f,m-1}$, where $TNA_{f,m}$ refers to the TNA of fund f in month m , and $r_{f,m}$ refers to fund total return in the same month. Quarterly flow is computed as the cumulative monthly flows over the quarter.

PRESSURE_2: The fraction of average volume from flow-motivated trading of stock i in a given quarter q is computed as follows:

$$PRESSURE_2_{i,q} = \frac{\sum_f (\max(0, FLOW_{f,q}) \times \max(0, \Delta HOLDINGS_{f,i,q})) - \sum_f (\max(0, -FLOW_{f,q}) \times \max(0, -\Delta HOLDINGS_{f,i,q}))}{AVG_VOLUME_{i,q-4;q-2}},$$

where all the variables are defined the same as in **PRESSURE_1** above, following Coval and Stafford (2007).

log(SIZE): The logarithm of the market capitalization of a stock, computed as the quarter-end stock price multiplied by shares outstanding, in millions.

log(BM): The logarithm of the book-to-market ratio of a stock, and the book-to-market ratio in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $BM_{i,q} = BE_{i,q}/ME_{i,q}$, where $BE_{i,q}$ refers to the book value of equity of stock i in quarter q , computed as the summation of stockholders' equity and deferred taxes, and $ME_{i,q}$ refers to its market value at the end of the previous year.

log(RET_VOL): The logarithm of the return volatility of a stock, computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in each quarter.

RETQ1: The cumulative monthly stock returns over the previous quarter.

RETQ2–4: The cumulative monthly stock returns over the 3 quarters ending at the beginning of the previous quarter.

NUM_FUND: The number of funds that hold a certain stock in each quarter, in thousands.

IO: The institutional ownership in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $IO_{i,q} = \sum_f SHR_{i,f,q} / SHROUT_{i,q}$, where $SHR_{i,f,q}$ refers to the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q , and $SHROUT_{i,q}$ refers to the shares outstanding at the same time.

HHI: The concentration of institutional ownership in a given quarter q is computed as follows: $HHI_{i,q} = \sum_f \left(SHR_{i,f,q} / \sum_f SHR_{i,f,q} \right)^2$, where $SHR_{i,f,q}$ refers to the number of shares of stock i held by fund f in quarter q .

ROA: The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets.

LEVERAGE: The ratio of long-term debt to total assets.

IVOL: The standard deviation of residuals estimated from a market model using daily returns in the past year.

Supplementary Material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <http://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109022000217>.

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